Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S965806AbcKJRqd (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Nov 2016 12:46:33 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:38536 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965102AbcKJRqZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Nov 2016 12:46:25 -0500 Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2016 10:46:01 -0700 From: Alex Williamson To: Auger Eric Cc: Will Deacon , drjones@redhat.com, Christoffer Dall , jason@lakedaemon.net, kvm@vger.kernel.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org, joro@8bytes.org, punit.agrawal@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, diana.craciun@nxp.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, pranav.sawargaonkar@gmail.com, arnd@arndb.de, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, jcm@redhat.com, Don Dutile , tglx@linutronix.de, robin.murphy@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, eric.auger.pro@gmail.com Subject: Re: Summary of LPC guest MSI discussion in Santa Fe Message-ID: <20161110104601.0939ba9a@t450s.home> In-Reply-To: References: <582371FB.2040808@redhat.com> <20161109192303.GD15676@cbox> <20161109203145.GO17771@arm.com> <20161109151709.74927f83@t450s.home> <20161109222522.GS17771@arm.com> <20161109162458.39594fdb@t450s.home> <20161109233847.GT17771@arm.com> <20161109165957.62c1eb61@t450s.home> <83b6440a-31eb-c1b4-642c-a4c311f37ef2@redhat.com> <20161109175517.174e7803@t450s.home> <20161110020130.GA19108@arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.28]); Thu, 10 Nov 2016 17:46:05 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 10621 Lines: 194 On Thu, 10 Nov 2016 12:14:40 +0100 Auger Eric wrote: > Hi Will, Alex, > > On 10/11/2016 03:01, Will Deacon wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 05:55:17PM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote: > >> On Thu, 10 Nov 2016 01:14:42 +0100 > >> Auger Eric wrote: > >>> On 10/11/2016 00:59, Alex Williamson wrote: > >>>> On Wed, 9 Nov 2016 23:38:50 +0000 > >>>> Will Deacon wrote: > >>>>> On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 04:24:58PM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote: > >>>>>> The VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA ioctl is a contract, the user ask to map a range > >>>>>> of IOVAs to a range of virtual addresses for a given device. If VFIO > >>>>>> cannot reasonably fulfill that contract, it must fail. It's up to QEMU > >>>>>> how to manage the hotplug and what memory regions it asks VFIO to map > >>>>>> for a device, but VFIO must reject mappings that it (or the SMMU by > >>>>>> virtue of using the IOMMU API) know to overlap reserved ranges. So I > >>>>>> still disagree with the referenced statement. Thanks, > >>>>> > >>>>> I think that's a pity. Not only does it mean that both QEMU and the kernel > >>>>> have more work to do (the former has to carve up its mapping requests, > >>>>> whilst the latter has to check that it is indeed doing this), but it also > >>>>> precludes the use of hugepage mappings on the IOMMU because of reserved > >>>>> regions. For example, a 4k hole someplace may mean we can't put down 1GB > >>>>> table entries for the guest memory in the SMMU. > >>>>> > >>>>> All this seems to do is add complexity and decrease performance. For what? > >>>>> QEMU has to go read the reserved regions from someplace anyway. It's also > >>>>> the way that VFIO works *today* on arm64 wrt reserved regions, it just has > >>>>> no way to identify those holes at present. > >>>> > >>>> Sure, that sucks, but how is the alternative even an option? The user > >>>> asked to map something, we can't, if we allow that to happen now it's a > >>>> bug. Put the MSI doorbells somewhere that this won't be an issue. If > >>>> the platform has it fixed somewhere that this is an issue, don't use > >>>> that platform. The correctness of the interface is more important than > >>>> catering to a poorly designed system layout IMO. Thanks, > >>> > >>> Besides above problematic, I started to prototype the sysfs API. A first > >>> issue I face is the reserved regions become global to the iommu instead > >>> of characterizing the iommu_domain, ie. the "reserved_regions" attribute > >>> file sits below an iommu instance (~ > >>> /sys/class/iommu/dmar0/intel-iommu/reserved_regions || > >>> /sys/class/iommu/arm-smmu0/arm-smmu/reserved_regions). > >>> > >>> MSI reserved window can be considered global to the IOMMU. However PCIe > >>> host bridge P2P regions rather are per iommu-domain. > > > > I don't think we can treat them as per-domain, given that we want to > > enumerate this stuff before we've decided to do a hotplug (and therefore > > don't have a domain). > That's the issue indeed. We need to wait for the PCIe device to be > connected to the iommu. Only on the VFIO SET_IOMMU we get the > comprehensive list of P2P regions that can impact IOVA mapping for this > iommu. This removes any advantage of sysfs API over previous VFIO > capability chain API for P2P IOVA range enumeration at early stage. For use through vfio we know that an iommu_domain is minimally composed of an iommu_group and we can find all the p2p resources of that group referencing /proc/iomem, at least for PCI-based groups. This is the part that I don't think any sort of iommu sysfs attributes should be duplicating. > >>> Do you confirm the attribute file should contain both global reserved > >>> regions and all per iommu_domain reserved regions? > >>> > >>> Thoughts? > >> > >> I don't think we have any business describing IOVA addresses consumed > >> by peer devices in an IOMMU sysfs file. If it's a separate device it > >> should be exposed by examining the rest of the topology. Regions > >> consumed by PCI endpoints and interconnects are already exposed in > >> sysfs. In fact, is this perhaps a more accurate model for these MSI > >> controllers too? Perhaps they should be exposed in the bus topology > >> somewhere as consuming the IOVA range. > Currently on x86 the P2P regions are not checked when allowing > passthrough. Aren't we more papist that the pope? As Don mentioned, > shouldn't we simply consider that a platform that does not support > proper ACS is not candidate for safe passthrough, like Juno? There are two sides here, there's the kernel side vfio and there's how QEMU makes use of vfio. On the kernel side, we create iommu groups as the set of devices we consider isolated, that doesn't necessarily mean that there isn't p2p within the group, in fact that potential often determines the composition of the group. It's the user's problem how to deal with that potential. When I talk about the contract with userspace, I consider that to be at the iommu mapping, ie. for transactions that actually make it to the iommu. In the case of x86, we know that DMA mappings overlapping the MSI doorbells won't be translated correctly, it's not a valid mapping for that range, and therefore the iommu driver backing the IOMMU API should describe that reserved range and reject mappings to it. For devices downstream of the IOMMU, whether they be p2p or MSI controllers consuming fixed IOVA space, I consider these to be problems beyond the scope of the IOMMU API, and maybe that's where we've been going wrong all along. Users like QEMU can currently discover potential p2p conflicts by looking at the composition of an iommu group and taking into account the host PCI resources of each device. We don't currently do this, though we probably should. The reason we typically don't run into problems with this is that (again) x86 has a fairly standard memory layout. Potential p2p regions are typically in an MMIO hole in the host that sufficiently matches an MMIO hole in the guest. So we don't often have VM RAM, which could be a DMA target, matching those p2p addresses. We also hope that any serious device assignment users have singleton iommu groups, ie. the IO subsystem is designed to support proper, fine grained isolation. > At least we can state the feature also is missing on x86 and it would be > nice to report the risk to the userspace and urge him to opt-in. Sure, but the information is already there, it's "just" a matter of QEMU taking it into account, which has some implications that VMs with any potential of doing device assignment need to be instantiated with address maps compatible with the host system, which is not an easy feat for something often considered the ugly step-child of virtualization. > To me taking into account those P2P still is controversial and induce > the bulk of the complexity. Considering the migration use case discussed > at LPC while only handling the MSI problem looks much easier. > host can choose an MSI base that is QEMU mach-virt friendly, ie. non RAM > region. Problem is to satisfy all potential uses though. When migrating, > mach-virt still is being used so there should not be any collision. Am I > missing some migration weird use cases here? Of course if we take into > consideration new host PCIe P2P regions this becomes completely different. Yep, x86 having a standard MSI range is a nice happenstance, so long as we're running an x86 VM, we don't worry about that being a DMA target. Running non-x86 VMs on x86 hosts hits this problem, but is several orders of magnitude lower priority. > We still have the good old v14 where the user space chose where MSI > IOVA's are put without any risk of collision ;-) > > >> If DMA to an IOVA is consumed > >> by an intermediate device before it hits the IOMMU vs not being > >> translated as specified by the user at the IOMMU, I'm less inclined to > >> call that something VFIO should reject. > > > > Oh, so perhaps we've been talking past each other. In all of these cases, > > the SMMU can translate the access if it makes it that far. The issue is > > that not all accesses do make it that far, because they may be "consumed" > > by another device, such as an MSI doorbell or another endpoint. In other > > words, I don't envisage a scenario where e.g. some address range just > > bypasses the SMMU straight to memory. I realise now that that's not clear > > from the slides I presented. As above, so long as a transaction that does make it to the iommu is translated as prescribed by the user, I have no basis for rejecting a user requested translation. Downstream MSI controllers consuming IOVA space is no different than the existing p2p problem that vfio considers a userspace issue. > >> However, instantiating a VM > >> with holes to account for every potential peer device seems like it > >> borders on insanity. Thanks, > > > > Ok, so rather than having a list of reserved regions under the iommu node, > > you're proposing that each region is attributed to the device that "owns" > > (consumes) it? I think that can work, but we need to make sure that: > > > > (a) The topology is walkable from userspace (where do you start?) For PCI devices userspace can examine the topology of the iommu group and exclude MMIO ranges of peer devices based on the BARs, which are exposed in various places, pci-sysfs as well as /proc/iomem. For non-PCI or MSI controllers... ??? > > (b) It also works for platform (non-PCI) devices, that lack much in the > > way of bus hierarchy No idea here, without a userspace visible topology the user is in the dark as to what devices potentially sit between them and the iommu. > > (c) It doesn't require Linux to have a driver bound to a device in order > > for the ranges consumed by that device to be advertised (again, > > more of an issue for non-PCI). Right, PCI has this problem solved, be more like PCI ;) > > How is this currently advertised for PCI? I'd really like to use the same > > scheme irrespective of the bus type. For all devices within an IOMMU group, /proc/iomem might be the solution, but I don't know how the MSI controller works. If the MSI controller belongs to the group, then maybe it's a matter of creating a struct device for it that consumes resources and making it show up in both the iommu group and /proc/iomem. An MSI controller shared between groups, which already sounds like a bit of a violation of iommu groups, would need to be discoverable some other way. Thanks, Alex