Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S938732AbcKOOj5 (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Nov 2016 09:39:57 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:59814 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753207AbcKOOjx (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Nov 2016 09:39:53 -0500 Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 15:39:44 +0100 From: Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Matt Fleming , Joerg Roedel , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Paolo Bonzini , Larry Woodman , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Thomas Gleixner , Dmitry Vyukov Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Message-ID: <20161115143943.GC2185@potion> References: <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.25]); Tue, 15 Nov 2016 14:39:53 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4107 Lines: 118 2016-11-09 18:37-0600, Tom Lendacky: > Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the > memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the > device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be > initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c > @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page, > enum dma_data_direction dir, > unsigned long attrs) > { > - dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset; > + dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset; > WARN_ON(size == 0); > if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size)) > return DMA_ERROR_CODE; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c > @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ > int swiotlb __read_mostly; > > void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size, > @@ -64,13 +66,15 @@ static struct dma_map_ops swiotlb_dma_ops = { > * pci_swiotlb_detect_override - set swiotlb to 1 if necessary > * > * This returns non-zero if we are forced to use swiotlb (by the boot > - * option). > + * option). If memory encryption is enabled then swiotlb will be set > + * to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for devices that > + * do not support the addressing range required for the encryption mask. > */ > int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_override(void) > { > int use_swiotlb = swiotlb | swiotlb_force; > > - if (swiotlb_force) > + if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask) > swiotlb = 1; > > return use_swiotlb; We want to return 1 even if only sme_me_mask is 1, because the return value is used for detection. The following would be less obscure, IMO: if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask) swiotlb = 1; return swiotlb; > diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c > @@ -598,6 +602,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) > */ > locking_selftest(); > > + /* > + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA > + * operations that might use the swiotlb bounce buffers. > + * This call will mark the bounce buffers as un-encrypted so > + * that their usage will not cause "plain-text" data to be > + * decrypted when accessed. > + */ > + mem_encrypt_init(); (Comments below are connected to the reason why we call this.) > diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c > @@ -159,6 +171,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void) > +/* > + * If memory encryption is active, the DMA address for an encrypted page may > + * be beyond the range of the device. If bounce buffers are required be sure > + * that they are not on an encrypted page. This should be called before the > + * iotlb area is used. > + */ > +void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void) > +{ > + void *vaddr; > + unsigned long bytes; > + > + if (no_iotlb_memory || !io_tlb_start || late_alloc) io_tlb_start seems redundant -- when can !no_iotlb_memory && !io_tlb_start happen? Is the order of calls 1) swiotlb init 2) SME init 3) swiotlb late init ? We setup encrypted swiotlb and then decrypt it, but sometimes set it up decrypted (late_alloc) ... why isn't the swiotlb set up decrypted directly? > + return; > + > + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start); > + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT); > + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes); > + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes); > + > + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer); > + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow); > + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes); > + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes); > +} > + > @@ -541,7 +583,7 @@ static phys_addr_t > map_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size, > enum dma_data_direction dir) > { > - dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start); > + dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start); We have decrypted io_tlb_start before, so shouldn't its physical address be saved without the sme bit? (Which changes a lot ...) Thanks.