Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754989AbcKVAcO (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Nov 2016 19:32:14 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:42490 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754902AbcKVAcL (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Nov 2016 19:32:11 -0500 Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode From: David Howells To: lukas@wunner.de Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Josh Boyer , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:32:08 +0000 Message-ID: <147977472850.6360.6174897435078432354.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <20161117123731.GA11573@wunner.de> References: <20161117123731.GA11573@wunner.de> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.27]); Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:32:10 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1994 Lines: 58 From: Josh Boyer A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable secure boot mode if that variable is set. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer Signed-off-by: David Howells --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c index e44d8c9ee150..d928398a3a52 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -23,10 +23,14 @@ int efi_get_secureboot(void) 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 }; static const efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = { 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 }; + static efi_char16_t const MokSBState_var_name[] = { + 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0 }; static const efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; - u8 val; + u32 attr; + u8 val, moksbstate; unsigned long size = sizeof(val); efi_status_t status; @@ -50,6 +54,22 @@ int efi_get_secureboot(void) if (val == 1) return 0; + /* See if a user has put shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the + * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well + * honor that. + */ + size = sizeof(moksbstate); + status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)MokSBState_var_name, &shim_guid, + &attr, &size, &moksbstate); + + /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return 1; + + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && + moksbstate == 1) + return 0; + return 1; out_efi_err: