Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 17:22:38 +0200
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
        linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
        Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Message-ID: <20161122171455-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
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On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 12:38:59PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 12:29:35PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > > Makes sense, but I think at least a dmesg warning here
> > > might be a good idea.
> > 
> > Good idea.  Should it be a warning when it is first being set up or
> > a warning the first time the bounce buffers need to be used.  Or maybe
> > both?
> 
> Ok, let me put my user hat on...
> 
> (... puts a felt hat ...)
> 
> so what am I supposed to do about this as a user? Go and physically
> remove those devices because I want to enable SME?!
> 
> IMO, the only thing we should do is issue a *single* warning -
> pr_warn_once - along the lines of:
> 
> "... devices present which due to SME will use bounce buffers and will
> cause their speed to diminish. Boot with sme=debug to see full info".
> 
> And then sme=debug will dump the whole gory details. I don't think
> screaming for each device is going to change anything in many cases.
> 99% of people don't care - they just want shit to work.

The issue is it's a (potential) security hole, not a slowdown.


> > > A boot flag that says "don't enable devices that don't support
> > > encryption" might be a good idea, too, since most people
> > > don't read dmesg output and won't notice the message.
> > 
> > I'll look into this. It might be something that can be checked as
> > part of the device setting its DMA mask or the first time a DMA
> > API is used if the device doesn't explicitly set its mask.
> 
> Still with my user hat on, what would be the purpose of such an option?
> 
> We already use bounce buffers so those devices do support encryption,
> albeit slower.
> 
> felt hat is confused.

To disable unsecure things. If someone enables SEV one might have an
expectation of security.  Might help push vendors to do the right thing
as a side effect.

> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.