Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756679AbcKVUlj (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Nov 2016 15:41:39 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:56456 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756115AbcKVUlg (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Nov 2016 15:41:36 -0500 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 22:41:30 +0200 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Rik van Riel , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Matt Fleming , Joerg Roedel , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Paolo Bonzini , Larry Woodman , Ingo Molnar , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Thomas Gleixner , Dmitry Vyukov Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Message-ID: <20161122224005-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20161115171443-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <4d97f998-5835-f4e0-9840-7f7979251275@amd.com> <20161122113859.5dtlrfgizwpum6st@pd.tnic> <20161122171455-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz@pd.tnic> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz@pd.tnic> X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.38]); Tue, 22 Nov 2016 20:41:36 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1052 Lines: 27 On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 04:41:37PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 05:22:38PM +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > The issue is it's a (potential) security hole, not a slowdown. > > How? Because the bounce buffers will be unencrypted and someone might > intercept them? Or even modify them. Guests generally trust devices since they assume they are under their control. > > To disable unsecure things. If someone enables SEV one might have an > > expectation of security. Might help push vendors to do the right thing > > as a side effect. > > Ok, you're looking at the SEV-cloud-multiple-guests aspect. Right, that > makes sense. > > I guess for SEV we should even flip the logic: disable such devices by > default and an opt-in option to enable them and issue a big fat warning. > I'd even want to let the guest users know that they're on a system which > cannot give them encrypted DMA to some devices... > > -- > Regards/Gruss, > Boris. > > Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.