Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S941234AbcKXTWW (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Nov 2016 14:22:22 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:59770 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757219AbcKXTWU (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Nov 2016 14:22:20 -0500 Message-ID: <1480015337.2444.12.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot From: James Bottomley To: Josh Boyer , Ard Biesheuvel Cc: David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , linux-security-module Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 11:22:17 -0800 In-Reply-To: References: <147931984418.16460.6639993676886095760.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <147931990222.16460.11621102657967011265.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.16.5 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1814 Lines: 38 On Mon, 2016-11-21 at 11:25 -0500, Josh Boyer wrote: > On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Ard Biesheuvel > wrote: > > On 16 November 2016 at 18:11, David Howells > > wrote: > > > From: Josh Boyer > > > > > > Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' > > > variable. This imports those certificates into the system trusted > > > keyring. This allows for a third party signing certificate to > > > be used in conjunction with signed modules. By importing the > > > public certificate into the 'db' variable, a user can allow a > > > module signed with that certificate to load. The shim UEFI > > > bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the > > > 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well. > > > > > > > This sounds like a bad idea to me. For the standard databases like > > db and dbx, we can rely on the firmware to ensure that they are > > what you expect. For MokListRt, not so much: anyone with sufficient > > capabilities can generate such a variable from userland, and not > > every arch/distro combo will be using shim and/or mokmanager. (The > > debates are still ongoing, but my position is that there is no need > > for shim at all on ARM given that the M$ problem only exists on > > x86) > > In order for MokListRT to be modified, the user has to have physical > access and boot into Mok and complete the enrollment. That is no > different than simply enrolling in db or dbx. I don't see a > difference in security under the thread model that Secure Boot is > attempting to protect against. Isn't a potential attack to write to MokListRT and then force a kexec? That means shim doesn't validate the variable yet you treat it as though it has been validated. James