Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261669AbTEMSI5 (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 May 2003 14:08:57 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261787AbTEMSIy (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 May 2003 14:08:54 -0400 Received: from pub237.cambridge.redhat.com ([213.86.99.237]:59366 "EHLO warthog.warthog") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261843AbTEMSIg (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 May 2003 14:08:36 -0400 To: Jan Harkes , Linus Torvalds , David Howells , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, openafs-devel@openafs.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] in-core AFS multiplexor and PAG support In-Reply-To: <20030513172029.GB25295@delft.aura.cs.cmu.edu> User-Agent: EMH/1.14.1 SEMI/1.14.4 (Hosorogi) FLIM/1.14.4 (=?ISO-8859-4?Q?Kashiharajing=FE-mae?=) APEL/10.4 Emacs/21.2 (i386-redhat-linux-gnu) MULE/5.0 (SAKAKI) MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.4 - "Hosorogi") Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 19:21:05 +0100 Message-ID: <9558.1052850065@warthog.warthog> From: David Howells Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1456 Lines: 31 > Right, if some process/user opens a file and then passes the descriptor > to another process/user which closes it. The close should operate under > the same permissions as the original opener. As long as the token isn't explicitly withdrawn. With my token structure, I've defined it such that if the list_head in the token struct is ever empty, then the token is withdrawn. Furthermore, I'm considering it such that the the filesystem will select a token from the PAG's token ring in the file_operations->open method and will attach it to the file->f_token at that point for quick reference later. > If someone obtains my user id on in any way (i.e. weak password/ > bufferoverflow/ root exploit), he should not be allowed to use or access > my tokens as he hasn't proven his identity. In this case he would either > still be in his original process authentication group, or a new and > empty PAG. But definitely not in any of my authentication groups. > > Which is also why joining a PAG should never be allowed. Someone asked for it, but I suspect if allowed at all it may be best that this ability is governed by its own capability bit and also that the security interface should be consulted. David - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/