Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S935210AbcLMT7F (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:59:05 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:54261 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S935238AbcLMTxQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:53:16 -0500 X-Amavis-Alert: BAD HEADER SECTION, Duplicate header field: "References" From: Jiri Slaby To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Johannes Berg , Jiri Slaby Subject: [PATCH 3.12 16/38] cfg80211: limit scan results cache size Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 20:52:42 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <15034b96ec06ee859b67c6cd4e3be569a4ef286b.1481658746.git.jslaby@suse.cz> References: <15034b96ec06ee859b67c6cd4e3be569a4ef286b.1481658746.git.jslaby@suse.cz> In-Reply-To: References: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 5079 Lines: 163 From: Johannes Berg 3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. =============== commit 9853a55ef1bb66d7411136046060bbfb69c714fa upstream. It's possible to make scanning consume almost arbitrary amounts of memory, e.g. by sending beacon frames with random BSSIDs at high rates while somebody is scanning. Limit the number of BSS table entries we're willing to cache to 1000, limiting maximum memory usage to maybe 4-5MB, but lower in practice - that would be the case for having both full-sized beacon and probe response frames for each entry; this seems not possible in practice, so a limit of 1000 entries will likely be closer to 0.5 MB. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby --- net/wireless/core.h | 1 + net/wireless/scan.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/core.h b/net/wireless/core.h index 3159e9c284c5..93917ffe1061 100644 --- a/net/wireless/core.h +++ b/net/wireless/core.h @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct cfg80211_registered_device { struct list_head bss_list; struct rb_root bss_tree; u32 bss_generation; + u32 bss_entries; struct cfg80211_scan_request *scan_req; /* protected by RTNL */ struct cfg80211_sched_scan_request *sched_scan_req; unsigned long suspend_at; diff --git a/net/wireless/scan.c b/net/wireless/scan.c index d4397eba5408..8e5f5a706c95 100644 --- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -55,6 +55,19 @@ * also linked into the probe response struct. */ +/* + * Limit the number of BSS entries stored in mac80211. Each one is + * a bit over 4k at most, so this limits to roughly 4-5M of memory. + * If somebody wants to really attack this though, they'd likely + * use small beacons, and only one type of frame, limiting each of + * the entries to a much smaller size (in order to generate more + * entries in total, so overhead is bigger.) + */ +static int bss_entries_limit = 1000; +module_param(bss_entries_limit, int, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(bss_entries_limit, + "limit to number of scan BSS entries (per wiphy, default 1000)"); + #define IEEE80211_SCAN_RESULT_EXPIRE (30 * HZ) static void bss_free(struct cfg80211_internal_bss *bss) @@ -135,6 +148,10 @@ static bool __cfg80211_unlink_bss(struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev, list_del_init(&bss->list); rb_erase(&bss->rbn, &dev->bss_tree); + dev->bss_entries--; + WARN_ONCE((dev->bss_entries == 0) ^ list_empty(&dev->bss_list), + "rdev bss entries[%d]/list[empty:%d] corruption\n", + dev->bss_entries, list_empty(&dev->bss_list)); bss_ref_put(dev, bss); return true; } @@ -339,6 +356,40 @@ void cfg80211_bss_expire(struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev) __cfg80211_bss_expire(dev, jiffies - IEEE80211_SCAN_RESULT_EXPIRE); } +static bool cfg80211_bss_expire_oldest(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev) +{ + struct cfg80211_internal_bss *bss, *oldest = NULL; + bool ret; + + lockdep_assert_held(&rdev->bss_lock); + + list_for_each_entry(bss, &rdev->bss_list, list) { + if (atomic_read(&bss->hold)) + continue; + + if (!list_empty(&bss->hidden_list) && + !bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss) + continue; + + if (oldest && time_before(oldest->ts, bss->ts)) + continue; + oldest = bss; + } + + if (WARN_ON(!oldest)) + return false; + + /* + * The callers make sure to increase rdev->bss_generation if anything + * gets removed (and a new entry added), so there's no need to also do + * it here. + */ + + ret = __cfg80211_unlink_bss(rdev, oldest); + WARN_ON(!ret); + return ret; +} + const u8 *cfg80211_find_ie(u8 eid, const u8 *ies, int len) { while (len > 2 && ies[0] != eid) { @@ -620,6 +671,7 @@ static bool cfg80211_combine_bsses(struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev, const u8 *ie; int i, ssidlen; u8 fold = 0; + u32 n_entries = 0; ies = rcu_access_pointer(new->pub.beacon_ies); if (WARN_ON(!ies)) @@ -643,6 +695,12 @@ static bool cfg80211_combine_bsses(struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev, /* This is the bad part ... */ list_for_each_entry(bss, &dev->bss_list, list) { + /* + * we're iterating all the entries anyway, so take the + * opportunity to validate the list length accounting + */ + n_entries++; + if (!ether_addr_equal(bss->pub.bssid, new->pub.bssid)) continue; if (bss->pub.channel != new->pub.channel) @@ -674,6 +732,10 @@ static bool cfg80211_combine_bsses(struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev, new->pub.beacon_ies); } + WARN_ONCE(n_entries != dev->bss_entries, + "rdev bss entries[%d]/list[len:%d] corruption\n", + dev->bss_entries, n_entries); + return true; } @@ -819,7 +881,14 @@ cfg80211_bss_update(struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev, } } + if (dev->bss_entries >= bss_entries_limit && + !cfg80211_bss_expire_oldest(dev)) { + kfree(new); + goto drop; + } + list_add_tail(&new->list, &dev->bss_list); + dev->bss_entries++; rb_insert_bss(dev, new); found = new; } -- 2.11.0