Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934210AbcLTVhD (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Dec 2016 16:37:03 -0500 Received: from imap.thunk.org ([74.207.234.97]:37822 "EHLO imap.thunk.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752700AbcLTVhA (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Dec 2016 16:37:00 -0500 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 16:36:36 -0500 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: Jean-Philippe Aumasson , Hannes Frederic Sowa , LKML , Eric Biggers , "Daniel J . Bernstein" , David Laight , David Miller , Andi Kleen , George Spelvin , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andy Lutomirski , Linux Crypto Mailing List , Tom Herbert , Vegard Nossum , Netdev , Linus Torvalds Subject: Re: HalfSipHash Acceptable Usage Message-ID: <20161220213636.tiqj2o4uupasr4aj@thunk.org> Mail-Followup-To: Theodore Ts'o , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Jean-Philippe Aumasson , Hannes Frederic Sowa , LKML , Eric Biggers , "Daniel J . Bernstein" , David Laight , David Miller , Andi Kleen , George Spelvin , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andy Lutomirski , Linux Crypto Mailing List , Tom Herbert , Vegard Nossum , Netdev , Linus Torvalds References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: NeoMutt/20161126 (1.7.1) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: tytso@thunk.org X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on imap.thunk.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 954 Lines: 20 On Mon, Dec 19, 2016 at 06:32:44PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > 1) Anything that requires actual long-term security will use > SipHash2-4, with the 64-bit output and the 128-bit key. This includes > things like TCP sequence numbers. This seems pretty uncontroversial to > me. Seem okay to you? Um, why do TCP sequence numbers need long-term security? So long as you rekey every 5 minutes or so, TCP sequence numbers don't need any more security than that, since even if you break the key used to generate initial sequence numbers seven a minute or two later, any pending TCP connections will have timed out long before. See the security analysis done in RFC 6528[1], where among other things, it points out why MD5 is acceptable with periodic rekeying, although there is the concern that this could break certain hueristics used when establishing new connections during the TIME-WAIT state. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6528 - Ted