Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1764837AbcLWLko (ORCPT ); Fri, 23 Dec 2016 06:40:44 -0500 Received: from mail.eperm.de ([89.247.134.16]:54976 "EHLO mail.eperm.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754395AbcLWLkm (ORCPT ); Fri, 23 Dec 2016 06:40:42 -0500 From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= To: Cyrille Pitchen Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, nicolas.ferre@atmel.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/12] crypto: atmel-authenc: add support to authenc(hmac(shaX),Y(aes)) modes Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2016 12:34:03 +0100 Message-ID: <1548507.knvAQkH9bK@tauon.atsec.com> User-Agent: KMail/5.3.3 (Linux/4.8.14-300.fc25.x86_64; KDE/5.27.0; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <2a6cc4637621d2ef0d84754817128c43795cb022.1482424395.git.cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com> References: <2a6cc4637621d2ef0d84754817128c43795cb022.1482424395.git.cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 15287 Lines: 474 Am Donnerstag, 22. Dezember 2016, 17:38:00 CET schrieb Cyrille Pitchen: Hi Cyrille, > This patchs allows to combine the AES and SHA hardware accelerators on > some Atmel SoCs. Doing so, AES blocks are only written to/read from the > AES hardware. Those blocks are also transferred from the AES to the SHA > accelerator internally, without additionnal accesses to the system busses. > > Hence, the AES and SHA accelerators work in parallel to process all the > data blocks, instead of serializing the process by (de)crypting those > blocks first then authenticating them after like the generic > crypto/authenc.c driver does. > > Of course, both the AES and SHA hardware accelerators need to be available > before we can start to process the data blocks. Hence we use their crypto > request queue to synchronize both drivers. > > Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen > --- > drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 12 + > drivers/crypto/atmel-aes-regs.h | 16 ++ > drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c | 471 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/crypto/atmel-authenc.h | > 64 ++++++ > drivers/crypto/atmel-sha-regs.h | 14 ++ > drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c | 344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 6 files changed, 906 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/atmel-authenc.h > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig > index 79564785ae30..719a868d8ea1 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig > @@ -415,6 +415,18 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_BFIN_CRC > Newer Blackfin processors have CRC hardware. Select this if you > want to use the Blackfin CRC module. > > +config CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AUTHENC > + tristate "Support for Atmel IPSEC/SSL hw accelerator" > + depends on (ARCH_AT91 && HAS_DMA) || COMPILE_TEST > + select CRYPTO_AUTHENC > + select CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES > + select CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_SHA > + help > + Some Atmel processors can combine the AES and SHA hw accelerators > + to enhance support of IPSEC/SSL. > + Select this if you want to use the Atmel modules for > + authenc(hmac(shaX),Y(cbc)) algorithms. > + > config CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES > tristate "Support for Atmel AES hw accelerator" > depends on HAS_DMA > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes-regs.h > b/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes-regs.h index 0ec04407b533..7694679802b3 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes-regs.h > +++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes-regs.h > @@ -68,6 +68,22 @@ > #define AES_CTRR 0x98 > #define AES_GCMHR(x) (0x9c + ((x) * 0x04)) > > +#define AES_EMR 0xb0 > +#define AES_EMR_APEN BIT(0) /* Auto Padding Enable */ > +#define AES_EMR_APM BIT(1) /* Auto Padding Mode */ > +#define AES_EMR_APM_IPSEC 0x0 > +#define AES_EMR_APM_SSL BIT(1) > +#define AES_EMR_PLIPEN BIT(4) /* PLIP Enable */ > +#define AES_EMR_PLIPD BIT(5) /* PLIP Decipher */ > +#define AES_EMR_PADLEN_MASK (0xFu << 8) > +#define AES_EMR_PADLEN_OFFSET 8 > +#define AES_EMR_PADLEN(padlen) (((padlen) << AES_EMR_PADLEN_OFFSET) &\ > + AES_EMR_PADLEN_MASK) > +#define AES_EMR_NHEAD_MASK (0xFu << 16) > +#define AES_EMR_NHEAD_OFFSET 16 > +#define AES_EMR_NHEAD(nhead) (((nhead) << AES_EMR_NHEAD_OFFSET) &\ > + AES_EMR_NHEAD_MASK) > + > #define AES_TWR(x) (0xc0 + ((x) * 0x04)) > #define AES_ALPHAR(x) (0xd0 + ((x) * 0x04)) > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c > index 9fd2f63b8bc0..3c651e0c3113 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c > +++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c > @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include "atmel-aes-regs.h" > +#include "atmel-authenc.h" > > #define ATMEL_AES_PRIORITY 300 > > @@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ > #define AES_FLAGS_INIT BIT(2) > #define AES_FLAGS_BUSY BIT(3) > #define AES_FLAGS_DUMP_REG BIT(4) > +#define AES_FLAGS_OWN_SHA BIT(5) > > #define AES_FLAGS_PERSISTENT (AES_FLAGS_INIT | AES_FLAGS_BUSY) > > @@ -92,6 +94,7 @@ struct atmel_aes_caps { > bool has_ctr32; > bool has_gcm; > bool has_xts; > + bool has_authenc; > u32 max_burst_size; > }; > > @@ -144,10 +147,31 @@ struct atmel_aes_xts_ctx { > u32 key2[AES_KEYSIZE_256 / sizeof(u32)]; > }; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AUTHENC > +struct atmel_aes_authenc_ctx { > + struct atmel_aes_base_ctx base; > + struct atmel_sha_authenc_ctx *auth; > +}; > +#endif > + > struct atmel_aes_reqctx { > unsigned long mode; > }; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AUTHENC > +struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx { > + struct atmel_aes_reqctx base; > + > + struct scatterlist src[2]; > + struct scatterlist dst[2]; > + size_t textlen; > + u32 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; > + > + /* auth_req MUST be place last. */ > + struct ahash_request auth_req; > +}; > +#endif > + > struct atmel_aes_dma { > struct dma_chan *chan; > struct scatterlist *sg; > @@ -291,6 +315,9 @@ static const char *atmel_aes_reg_name(u32 offset, char > *tmp, size_t sz) snprintf(tmp, sz, "GCMHR[%u]", (offset - AES_GCMHR(0)) >> > 2); > break; > > + case AES_EMR: > + return "EMR"; > + > case AES_TWR(0): > case AES_TWR(1): > case AES_TWR(2): > @@ -463,8 +490,16 @@ static inline bool atmel_aes_is_encrypt(const struct > atmel_aes_dev *dd) return (dd->flags & AES_FLAGS_ENCRYPT); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AUTHENC > +static void atmel_aes_authenc_complete(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err); > +#endif > + > static inline int atmel_aes_complete(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err) > { > +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AUTHENC > + atmel_aes_authenc_complete(dd, err); > +#endif > + > clk_disable(dd->iclk); > dd->flags &= ~AES_FLAGS_BUSY; > > @@ -1931,6 +1966,407 @@ static struct crypto_alg aes_xts_alg = { > } > }; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AUTHENC > +/* authenc aead functions */ > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_start(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd); > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_init(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err, > + bool is_async); > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_transfer(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err, > + bool is_async); > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_digest(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd); > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_final(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err, > + bool is_async); > + > +static void atmel_aes_authenc_complete(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err) > +{ > + struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(dd->areq); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + > + if (err && (dd->flags & AES_FLAGS_OWN_SHA)) > + atmel_sha_authenc_abort(&rctx->auth_req); > + dd->flags &= ~AES_FLAGS_OWN_SHA; > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_copy_assoc(struct aead_request *req) > +{ > + size_t buflen, assoclen = req->assoclen; > + off_t skip = 0; > + u8 buf[256]; > + > + while (assoclen) { > + buflen = min_t(size_t, assoclen, sizeof(buf)); > + > + if (sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, sg_nents(req->src), > + buf, buflen, skip) != buflen) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (sg_pcopy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents(req->dst), > + buf, buflen, skip) != buflen) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + skip += buflen; > + assoclen -= buflen; > + } This seems to be a very expansive operation. Wouldn't it be easier, leaner and with one less memcpy to use the approach of crypto_authenc_copy_assoc? Instead of copying crypto_authenc_copy_assoc, what about carving the logic in crypto/authenc.c out into a generic aead helper code as we need to add that to other AEAD implementations? > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_start(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd) > +{ > + struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(dd->areq); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); > + int err; > + > + atmel_aes_set_mode(dd, &rctx->base); > + > + err = atmel_aes_hw_init(dd); > + if (err) > + return atmel_aes_complete(dd, err); > + > + return atmel_sha_authenc_schedule(&rctx->auth_req, ctx->auth, > + atmel_aes_authenc_init, dd); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_init(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err, > + bool is_async) > +{ > + struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(dd->areq); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + > + if (is_async) > + dd->is_async = true; > + if (err) > + return atmel_aes_complete(dd, err); > + > + /* If here, we've got the ownership of the SHA device. */ > + dd->flags |= AES_FLAGS_OWN_SHA; > + > + /* Configure the SHA device. */ > + return atmel_sha_authenc_init(&rctx->auth_req, > + req->src, req->assoclen, > + rctx->textlen, > + atmel_aes_authenc_transfer, dd); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_transfer(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err, > + bool is_async) > +{ > + struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(dd->areq); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + bool enc = atmel_aes_is_encrypt(dd); > + struct scatterlist *src, *dst; > + u32 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; > + u32 emr; > + > + if (is_async) > + dd->is_async = true; > + if (err) > + return atmel_aes_complete(dd, err); > + > + /* Prepare src and dst scatter-lists to transfer cipher/plain texts. */ > + src = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->src, req->src, req->assoclen); > + dst = src; > + > + if (req->src != req->dst) { > + err = atmel_aes_authenc_copy_assoc(req); > + if (err) > + return atmel_aes_complete(dd, err); > + > + dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst, req->dst, req->assoclen); > + } > + > + /* Configure the AES device. */ > + memcpy(iv, req->iv, sizeof(iv)); > + > + /* > + * Here we always set the 2nd parameter of atmel_aes_write_ctrl() to > + * 'true' even if the data transfer is actually performed by the CPU (so > + * not by the DMA) because we must force the AES_MR_SMOD bitfield to the > + * value AES_MR_SMOD_IDATAR0. Indeed, both AES_MR_SMOD and SHA_MR_SMOD > + * must be set to *_MR_SMOD_IDATAR0. > + */ > + atmel_aes_write_ctrl(dd, true, iv); > + emr = AES_EMR_PLIPEN; > + if (!enc) > + emr |= AES_EMR_PLIPD; > + atmel_aes_write(dd, AES_EMR, emr); > + > + /* Transfer data. */ > + return atmel_aes_dma_start(dd, src, dst, rctx->textlen, > + atmel_aes_authenc_digest); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_digest(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd) > +{ > + struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(dd->areq); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + > + /* atmel_sha_authenc_final() releases the SHA device. */ > + dd->flags &= ~AES_FLAGS_OWN_SHA; > + return atmel_sha_authenc_final(&rctx->auth_req, > + rctx->digest, sizeof(rctx->digest), > + atmel_aes_authenc_final, dd); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_final(struct atmel_aes_dev *dd, int err, > + bool is_async) > +{ > + struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(dd->areq); > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); > + bool enc = atmel_aes_is_encrypt(dd); > + u32 idigest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], *odigest = rctx->digest; > + u32 offs, authsize; > + > + if (is_async) > + dd->is_async = true; > + if (err) > + goto complete; > + > + offs = req->assoclen + rctx->textlen; > + authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); > + if (enc) { > + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(odigest, req->dst, offs, authsize, 1); > + } else { > + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(idigest, req->src, offs, authsize, 0); > + if (crypto_memneq(idigest, odigest, authsize)) > + err = -EBADMSG; > + } > + > +complete: > + return atmel_aes_complete(dd, err); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, > + unsigned int keylen) > +{ > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); > + struct crypto_authenc_keys keys; > + u32 flags; > + int err; > + > + if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) > + goto badkey; > + > + if (keys.enckeylen > sizeof(ctx->base.key)) > + goto badkey; > + > + /* Save auth key. */ > + flags = crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm); > + err = atmel_sha_authenc_setkey(ctx->auth, > + keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, > + &flags); > + crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, flags & CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK); > + if (err) > + return err; > + > + /* Save enc key. */ > + ctx->base.keylen = keys.enckeylen; > + memcpy(ctx->base.key, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen); memzero_explicit(keys) please > + > + return 0; > + > +badkey: > + crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); > + return -EINVAL; > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm, > + unsigned long auth_mode) > +{ > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); > + unsigned int auth_reqsize = atmel_sha_authenc_get_reqsize(); > + > + ctx->auth = atmel_sha_authenc_spawn(auth_mode); > + if (IS_ERR(ctx->auth)) > + return PTR_ERR(ctx->auth); > + > + crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, (sizeof(struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx) + > + auth_reqsize)); > + ctx->base.start = atmel_aes_authenc_start; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_hmac_sha1_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm) > +{ > + return atmel_aes_authenc_init_tfm(tfm, SHA_FLAGS_HMAC_SHA1); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_hmac_sha224_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm) > +{ > + return atmel_aes_authenc_init_tfm(tfm, SHA_FLAGS_HMAC_SHA224); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_hmac_sha256_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm) > +{ > + return atmel_aes_authenc_init_tfm(tfm, SHA_FLAGS_HMAC_SHA256); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_hmac_sha384_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm) > +{ > + return atmel_aes_authenc_init_tfm(tfm, SHA_FLAGS_HMAC_SHA384); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_hmac_sha512_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm) > +{ > + return atmel_aes_authenc_init_tfm(tfm, SHA_FLAGS_HMAC_SHA512); > +} > + > +static void atmel_aes_authenc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm) > +{ > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); > + > + atmel_sha_authenc_free(ctx->auth); > +} > + > +static int atmel_aes_authenc_crypt(struct aead_request *req, > + unsigned long mode) > +{ > + struct atmel_aes_authenc_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req); > + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); > + struct atmel_aes_base_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); > + u32 authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); > + bool enc = (mode & AES_FLAGS_ENCRYPT); > + struct atmel_aes_dev *dd; > + > + /* Compute text length. */ > + rctx->textlen = req->cryptlen - (enc ? 0 : authsize); Is there somewhere a check that authsize is always < req->cryptlen (at least it escaped me)? Note, this logic will be exposed to user space which may do funky things. > + > + /* > + * Currently, empty messages are not supported yet: > + * the SHA auto-padding can be used only on non-empty messages. > + * Hence a special case needs to be implemented for empty message. > + */ > + if (!rctx->textlen && !req->assoclen) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + rctx->base.mode = mode; > + ctx->block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; > + > + dd = atmel_aes_find_dev(ctx); > + if (!dd) > + return -ENODEV; > + > + return atmel_aes_handle_queue(dd, &req->base); Ciao Stephan