Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932306AbdCFR7I (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2017 12:59:08 -0500 Received: from mail-cys01nam02on0052.outbound.protection.outlook.com ([104.47.37.52]:49078 "EHLO NAM02-CY1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932272AbdCFR6u (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2017 12:58:50 -0500 Authentication-Results: google.com; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;google.com; dmarc=none action=none header.from=amd.com; Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME To: Dave Young References: <20170216154158.19244.66630.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170216154755.19244.51276.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170217155756.GJ30272@char.us.ORACLE.com> <20170301092536.GB8353@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , , , , , , , , , , Rik van Riel , =?UTF-8?B?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Toshimitsu Kani , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Matt Fleming , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Joerg Roedel , Paolo Bonzini , Brijesh Singh , Ingo Molnar , Alexander Potapenko , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Andrey Ryabinin , Thomas Gleixner , Larry Woodman , Dmitry Vyukov From: Tom Lendacky Message-ID: <998eb58b-eefd-3093-093f-9ae25ddda472@amd.com> Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 11:58:40 -0600 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.7.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170301092536.GB8353@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Originating-IP: [165.204.77.1] X-ClientProxiedBy: MWHPR21CA0016.namprd21.prod.outlook.com (10.173.47.26) To DM5PR12MB1145.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (10.168.236.140) X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 2e0cf17c-1503-40a2-7440-08d464ba7055 X-MS-Office365-Filtering-HT: Tenant X-Microsoft-Antispam: UriScan:;BCL:0;PCL:0;RULEID:(22001)(48565401081);SRVR:DM5PR12MB1145; X-Microsoft-Exchange-Diagnostics: 1;DM5PR12MB1145;3:VFqcq8mnPFJnBTfw3gWEKZWULtsiUMwelkILepg/qlKzPt+9JExQn0I7xqg+beLyejM42zeySD42ldSUhtWyTgu+eB6gyLYbkem5H80cQWRmFPKaQTXeRuYLzr5a06y1cWoL/ZNwPOyJVr1xistE+aGsWL4hIZpbK1Em1vdL9JH8wVDbhpts3+Q5hG5UIrTXWuELZYyF1QRr0B2syHk1rCM0dquZYw51MZaLiFHgY+4Zmoop13SjPVPL/aN4noolziMmZ/dzd3hs3/UHFxCYdqYi6OgTM1AhGOJqkZv/IG4=;25:F0sGRHMTS5tFCSkGQqOPuAXAMASBuovR7txEOFgmqjdh+iKXjsWB2yMTSMubYL1WUs8UklzkKg2u/ZQvt2IIouFXGmW+V+wG4d5qB5T1ZpuCD4sTGAr1F0hJapKkI2+Dz5pUD7NvONkA0H1D9QJB2z/RBSsTEtT0EItKYRZuSSEZqP/jYlMctk/Kd7aipdg4g9tPSGJM+WGiMHFaVof9TMJrrpOQOKyMD2Kx2x60BBgJEc47wp4cjdgG8nJHrNJSSvb1xVJr3j3njZxz2Mp7kDQj7WvfEtXaQKdi1nBuqin24Cklihj05dh0J0vms2bUdWEcjQ7myE9EErMMLpj7JZImXz9jOtv1IvMzUBvT3IZfSRY/SBZ3H0OZVFhn6kjPOReBjS2mjFfTdY1+I8MLZCVOXTL3KFwajlgoZICMmaVcd08cSJFyBr5wo8ad7vmeV6n6oe9eSbyAeRBj4fnX9Q== X-Microsoft-Exchange-Diagnostics: 1;DM5PR12MB1145;31:BDxQI27bttWpQ++LkZ6KOIEKntLZcxYrwleLh3z9himn4nFpt/jAXAbjtix3QOcI7LLzS54RKMk0aZG5+GgEI++IAr7yl4H33ZJ6bYbZlrKNYHkGB90m430wEBWZh1bx4Y+lVduThRgqUCvDHrOftwdoL+hctQroMiimUdBVXT34+wxOa/O0kwewygQG65zVY5U62taDMWZXgAOvy+XGKwW4jy6O6op4ijPxrsJPT2E=;20: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 X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-Exchange-Antispam-Report-Test: UriScan:; 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But if the >>> rest of the memory is encrypted you won't get much, will you? >> >> Kexec can be used to reboot a system without going back through BIOS. >> So you can use kexec without using kdump. >> >> For kdump, just taking a quick look, the option to enable memory >> encryption can be provided on the crash kernel command line and then > > Is there a simple way to get the SME status? Probably add some sysfs > file for this purpose. Currently there is not. I can look at adding something, maybe just the sme_me_mask value, which if non-zero, would indicate SME is active. > >> crash kernel can would be able to copy the memory decrypted if the >> pagetable is set up properly. It looks like currently ioremap_cache() >> is used to map the old memory page. That might be able to be changed >> to a memremap() so that the encryption bit is set in the mapping. That >> will mean that memory that is not marked encrypted (EFI tables, swiotlb >> memory, etc) would not be read correctly. > > Manage to store info about those ranges which are not encrypted so that > memremap can handle them? I can look into whether something can be done in this area. Any input you can provide as to what would be the best way/place to store the range info so kdump can make use of it, would be greatly appreciated. > >> >>> >>> Would it make sense to include some printk to the user if they >>> are setting up kdump that they won't get anything out of it? >> >> Probably a good idea to add something like that. > > It will break kdump functionality, it should be fixed instead of > just adding printk to warn user.. I do want kdump to work. I'll investigate further what can be done in this area. Thanks, Tom > > Thanks > Dave >