Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751153AbdCTEHm (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Mar 2017 00:07:42 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:58730 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750704AbdCTEHl (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Mar 2017 00:07:41 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com CA24FC054C4C Authentication-Results: ext-mx08.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx08.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=bhe@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com CA24FC054C4C Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 11:55:09 +0800 From: Baoquan He To: xlpang@redhat.com Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , kexec@lists.infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Dave Young , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: Introduce vmcoreinfo signature verification Message-ID: <20170320035509.GB22469@x1> References: <1489722318-13695-1-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com> <874lyrhl81.fsf@xmission.com> <20170320021330.GA22469@x1> <58CF40E5.6010104@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <58CF40E5.6010104@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.7.0 (2016-08-17) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.32]); Mon, 20 Mar 2017 03:55:19 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6885 Lines: 185 On 03/20/17 at 10:39am, Xunlei Pang wrote: > On 03/20/2017 at 10:13 AM, Baoquan He wrote: > > On 03/17/17 at 12:22pm, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> Xunlei Pang writes: > >> > >>> Currently vmcoreinfo data is updated at boot time subsys_initcall(), > >>> it has the risk of being modified by some wrong code during system > >>> is running. > >>> > >>> As a result, vmcore dumped may contain the wrong vmcoreinfo. Later on, > >>> when using "crash" or "makedumpfile"(etc) utility to parse this vmcore, > >>> we probably will get "Segmentation fault" or other unexpected/confusing > >>> errors. > >> If this is a real concern and the previous discussion sounds like it is > >> part of what we need to do is move the variable vmcoreinfo_note out > >> of the kernel's .bss section. And modify the code to regenerate > >> and keep this information in something like the control page. > > I guess this is not from a real issue, just from Xunlei's worry. But > > Xunlei didn't give a direct answer to this, and Petr's question. Not > > It's easy to reproduce: write a kernel module to modify part content of > vmcoreinfo_data (we surely have many ways to acquire its VA). If it does > exist in theory, we will met it sooner or later in real world due to billions > of applications. > > Also there are bugs like this one > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1287097 > Not sure if it is makedumpfile issue or this one, maybe we can't know forever. Well, kdump is not all-purpose. If you write code in module to stomp page init_level4_pgt is pointing at, you won't get a vmcore. And you are saying vmcoreinfo_data, it's a intermediate page, should be vmcoreinfo_note. If the wrong code you mentioned didn't change vmcoreinfo_note, but other kernel data which need be saved into vmcoreinfo_note, crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init is doing better than you re-saved one. > > Regards, > Xunlei > > > very sure if this will impact other implementation. fadump will be > > impacted by this or other dump? Maybe yet or maybe not. > > > > I don't object this strongly, but please at least add code comment to > > explain why vmcoreinfo need be saved twice because it does look weird. > > > >> Definitely something like this needs a page all to itself, and ideally > >> far away from any other kernel data structures. I clearly was not > >> watching closely the data someone decided to keep this silly thing > >> in the kernel's .bss section. > >> > >>> As vmcoreinfo is the most fundamental information for vmcore, we better > >>> double check its correctness. Here we generate a signature(using crc32) > >>> after it is saved, then verify it in crash_save_vmcoreinfo() to see if > >>> the signature was broken, if so we have to re-save the vmcoreinfo data > >>> to get the correct vmcoreinfo for kdump as possible as we can. > >> Sigh. We already have a sha256 that is supposed to cover this sort of > >> thing. The bug rather is that apparently it isn't covering this data. > >> That sounds like what we should be fixing. > >> > >> Please let's not invent new mechanisms we have to maintain. Let's > >> reorganize this so this static data is protected like all other static > >> data in the kexec-on-panic path. We have good mechanims and good > >> strategies for avoiding and detecting corruption we just need to use > >> them. > >> > >> Eric > >> > >> > >> > >>> Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang > >>> --- > >>> v1->v2: > >>> - Keep crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init() because "makedumpfile --mem-usage" > >>> uses the information. > >>> - Add crc32 verification for vmcoreinfo, re-save when failure. > >>> > >>> arch/Kconfig | 1 + > >>> kernel/kexec_core.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > >>> 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > >>> > >>> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig > >>> index c4d6833..66eb296 100644 > >>> --- a/arch/Kconfig > >>> +++ b/arch/Kconfig > >>> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > >>> > >>> config KEXEC_CORE > >>> bool > >>> + select CRC32 > >>> > >>> config HAVE_IMA_KEXEC > >>> bool > >>> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c > >>> index bfe62d5..012acbe 100644 > >>> --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c > >>> +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c > >>> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ > >>> #include > >>> #include > >>> #include > >>> +#include > >>> > >>> #include > >>> #include > >>> @@ -53,9 +54,10 @@ > >>> > >>> /* vmcoreinfo stuff */ > >>> static unsigned char vmcoreinfo_data[VMCOREINFO_BYTES]; > >>> -u32 vmcoreinfo_note[VMCOREINFO_NOTE_SIZE/4]; > >>> +static u32 vmcoreinfo_sig; > >>> size_t vmcoreinfo_size; > >>> size_t vmcoreinfo_max_size = sizeof(vmcoreinfo_data); > >>> +u32 vmcoreinfo_note[VMCOREINFO_NOTE_SIZE/4]; > >>> > >>> /* Flag to indicate we are going to kexec a new kernel */ > >>> bool kexec_in_progress = false; > >>> @@ -1367,12 +1369,6 @@ static void update_vmcoreinfo_note(void) > >>> final_note(buf); > >>> } > >>> > >>> -void crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void) > >>> -{ > >>> - vmcoreinfo_append_str("CRASHTIME=%ld\n", get_seconds()); > >>> - update_vmcoreinfo_note(); > >>> -} > >>> - > >>> void vmcoreinfo_append_str(const char *fmt, ...) > >>> { > >>> va_list args; > >>> @@ -1402,7 +1398,7 @@ phys_addr_t __weak paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void) > >>> return __pa_symbol((unsigned long)(char *)&vmcoreinfo_note); > >>> } > >>> > >>> -static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void) > >>> +static void do_crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void) > >>> { > >>> VMCOREINFO_OSRELEASE(init_uts_ns.name.release); > >>> VMCOREINFO_PAGESIZE(PAGE_SIZE); > >>> @@ -1474,6 +1470,37 @@ static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void) > >>> #endif > >>> > >>> arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo(); > >>> +} > >>> + > >>> +static u32 crash_calc_vmcoreinfo_sig(void) > >>> +{ > >>> + return crc32(~0, vmcoreinfo_data, vmcoreinfo_size); > >>> +} > >>> + > >>> +static bool crash_verify_vmcoreinfo(void) > >>> +{ > >>> + if (crash_calc_vmcoreinfo_sig() == vmcoreinfo_sig) > >>> + return true; > >>> + > >>> + return false; > >>> +} > >>> + > >>> +void crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void) > >>> +{ > >>> + /* Re-save if verification fails */ > >>> + if (!crash_verify_vmcoreinfo()) { > >>> + vmcoreinfo_size = 0; > >>> + do_crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(); > >>> + } > >>> + > >>> + vmcoreinfo_append_str("CRASHTIME=%ld\n", get_seconds()); > >>> + update_vmcoreinfo_note(); > >>> +} > >>> + > >>> +static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void) > >>> +{ > >>> + do_crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(); > >>> + vmcoreinfo_sig = crash_calc_vmcoreinfo_sig(); > >>> update_vmcoreinfo_note(); > >>> > >>> return 0; > > > _______________________________________________ > kexec mailing list > kexec@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec