Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758912AbdCVJBB (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Mar 2017 05:01:01 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:54774 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758795AbdCVJAz (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Mar 2017 05:00:55 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 3824A4E4C6 Authentication-Results: ext-mx09.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx09.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=david@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com 3824A4E4C6 Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] KVM: VMX: Fix enable VPID even if INVVPID is not exposed in vmx capability To: Wanpeng Li , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org References: <1490145561-2638-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini , =?UTF-8?B?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Wanpeng Li From: David Hildenbrand Organization: Red Hat GmbH Message-ID: Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 09:50:26 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1490145561-2638-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.38]); Wed, 22 Mar 2017 08:50:29 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2781 Lines: 81 On 22.03.2017 02:19, Wanpeng Li wrote: > From: Wanpeng Li > > This can be reproduced by running L2 on L1, and disable VPID on L0 if w/o > commit "KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control", the L2 crash as below: > > KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0x7 > EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000306c3 > ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000 > EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0 > ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 > CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00 > SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 > DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 > FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 > GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 > LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200 > TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00 > GDT= 00000000 0000ffff > IDT= 00000000 0000ffff > CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000 > DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000 > DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400 > EFER=0000000000000000 > > Reference SDM 30.3 INVVPID: > > Protected Mode Exceptions > #UD > - If not in VMX operation. > - If the logical processor does not support VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=0). > - If the logical processor supports VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=1) but does > not support the INVVPID instruction (IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP[32]=0). > > So we should check both VPID enable bit in vmx exec control and INVVPID support bit > in vmx capability MSRs to enable VPID. This patch adds the guarantee to not enable VPID > if INVVPID is not exposed in vmx capability MSRs. > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini > Cc: Radim Krčmář > Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li > --- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 8 +++++++- > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > index 8795a70..f2b912e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > @@ -1239,6 +1239,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global(void) > return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT; > } > > +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid(void) > +{ > + return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT; > +} > + > static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept(void) > { > return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & > @@ -6518,8 +6523,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) > kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX); > > - if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid()) > + if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid()) > enable_vpid = 0; > + > if (!cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs()) > enable_shadow_vmcs = 0; > if (enable_shadow_vmcs) > Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand -- Thanks, David