Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933666AbdDERIi (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Apr 2017 13:08:38 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:35760 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755707AbdDERIR (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Apr 2017 13:08:17 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 7E56BC04B94F Authentication-Results: ext-mx07.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx07.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dhowells@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com 7E56BC04B94F Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: David Howells To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Dave Young Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:08:07 +0100 Message-ID: <149141208783.30815.12896516831173762041.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <149141201983.30815.1240162780237131881.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <149141201983.30815.1240162780237131881.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.31]); Wed, 05 Apr 2017 17:08:11 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1237 Lines: 32 From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index d0a814a9d96a..3551bcaa1eaf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;