Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754096AbdDGHma (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Apr 2017 03:42:30 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:52518 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754154AbdDGHmL (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Apr 2017 03:42:11 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 47F27C04B93A Authentication-Results: ext-mx07.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx07.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dyoung@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com 47F27C04B93A Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 15:41:59 +0800 From: Dave Young To: David Howells Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Chun-Yi Lee , gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Message-ID: <20170407074159.GB10737@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> References: <20170407061935.GB10100@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <149142335441.5101.2294976563846442575.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20170407030545.GA4296@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <1491536950.4184.10.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <21418.1491548875@warthog.procyon.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <21418.1491548875@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.7.1 (2016-10-04) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.31]); Fri, 07 Apr 2017 07:42:10 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1102 Lines: 29 On 04/07/17 at 08:07am, David Howells wrote: > Dave Young wrote: > > > > > > + /* Don't permit images to be loaded into trusted kernels if we're not > > > > > + * going to verify the signature on them > > > > > + */ > > > > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down()) > > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > IMA can be used to verify file signatures too, based on the LSM hooks > > > in ?kernel_read_file_from_fd(). ?CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG should not be > > > required. > > > > Mimi, I remember we talked somthing before about the two signature > > verification. One can change IMA policy in initramfs userspace, > > also there are kernel cmdline param to disable IMA, so it can break the > > lockdown? Suppose kexec boot with ima disabled cmdline param and then > > kexec reboot again.. > > I guess I should lock down the parameter to disable IMA too. That is one thing, user can change IMA policy in initramfs userspace, I'm not sure if IMA enforce the signed policy now, if no it will be also a problem. Thanks Dave