Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754768AbdDGICE (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Apr 2017 04:02:04 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:42664 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753282AbdDGIB4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Apr 2017 04:01:56 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 806727AEAE Authentication-Results: ext-mx01.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx01.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dyoung@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com 806727AEAE Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 16:01:44 +0800 From: Dave Young To: Mimi Zohar Cc: David Howells , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Chun-Yi Lee , gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Message-ID: <20170407080144.GC10737@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> References: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <149142335441.5101.2294976563846442575.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20170407030545.GA4296@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <1491536950.4184.10.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170407061935.GB10100@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <1491551101.4184.48.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <1491551101.4184.48.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.7.1 (2016-10-04) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.25]); Fri, 07 Apr 2017 08:01:55 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3526 Lines: 89 On 04/07/17 at 03:45am, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 14:19 +0800, Dave Young wrote: > > On 04/06/17 at 11:49pm, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 11:05 +0800, Dave Young wrote: > > > > On 04/05/17 at 09:15pm, David Howells wrote: > > > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee > > > > > > > > > > When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image > > > > > through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set. > > > > > > > > > > This code was showed in Matthew's patch but not in git: > > > > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/13/778 > > I specifically checked to make sure that either kexec_file() signature > verification was acceptable and would have commented then, if it had > not been included. > > > > > > Cc: Matthew Garrett > > > > > Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Howells > > > > > cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org > > > > > --- > > > > > > > > > > kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++ > > > > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > index b118735fea9d..f6937eecd1eb 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > @@ -268,6 +268,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, > > > > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > > > > > return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Don't permit images to be loaded into trusted kernels if we're not > > > > > + * going to verify the signature on them > > > > > + */ > > > > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down()) > > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > IMA can be used to verify file signatures too, based on the LSM hooks > > > in ?kernel_read_file_from_fd(). ?CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG should not be > > > required. > > > > Mimi, I remember we talked somthing before about the two signature > > verification. One can change IMA policy in initramfs userspace, > > also there are kernel cmdline param to disable IMA, so it can break the > > lockdown? Suppose kexec boot with ima disabled cmdline param and then > > kexec reboot again.. > > Right, we discussed that the same method of measuring the kexec image > and initramfs, for extending trusted boot to the OS, could also be > used for verifying the kexec image and initramfs signatures, for > extending secure boot to the OS. ?The file hash would be calculated > once for both. > > All of your concerns could be addressed with very minor changes to > IMA. ?(Continued in response to David.) Thanks! As long as IMA can ensure not breaking the lockdown it should be fine to add an check for either !CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG or !IMA enforced. > > > > > > > > /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ > > > > > if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > kexec mailing list > > > > > kexec@lists.infradead.org > > > > > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec > > > > > > > > Acked-by: Dave Young > > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > Dave > > > > -- > > > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > > > > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > > > > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > > > > > > > > > >