Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933550AbdDGMgo (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Apr 2017 08:36:44 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:49664 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932949AbdDGMgd (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Apr 2017 08:36:33 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set From: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: Dave Young , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Chun-Yi Lee , gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2017 08:36:17 -0400 In-Reply-To: <27362.1491556638@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <1491551180.4184.50.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1491536950.4184.10.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <149142335441.5101.2294976563846442575.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20170407030545.GA4296@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <21572.1491548994@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <27362.1491556638@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable x-cbid: 17040712-0020-0000-0000-000000E26ACF X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17040712-0021-0000-0000-000002A1A42C Message-Id: <1491568577.4184.97.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-04-07_11:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1702020001 definitions=main-1704070106 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1462 Lines: 37 On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 10:17 +0100, David Howells wrote: > Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > Okay, fair enough. I can stick in an OR with an IS_ENABLED on some IMA > > > symbol. CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC maybe? And also require IMA be enabled? > > > > Not quite, since as Dave pointed out, IMA is policy driven. As a > > policy is installed, we could set a flag. > > Does such a flag exist as yet? Not exactly what is needed.  There's a flag named ima_appraise, which is used internally in IMA. A temporary flag is created, while validating the rules. if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK) temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; If the entire policy is valid, ima_update_policy_flag() sets the ima_appraise flag. ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise; >From an IMA perspective, either a file hash or signature are valid, but for this usage it must be a signature.  So in addition to testing entry->func, above, entry->flags would need to be tested as well to detect if IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED is set. Mimi