Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757912AbdDRUSa (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:18:30 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:52601 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757806AbdDRUS1 (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:18:27 -0400 From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Claudio Carvalho , Thiago Jung Bauermann Subject: [PATCH 3/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show. Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 17:17:43 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1492546666-16615-1-git-send-email-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1492546666-16615-1-git-send-email-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-MML: disable x-cbid: 17041820-0020-0000-0000-000002A0F786 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17041820-0021-0000-0000-000030BE126E Message-Id: <1492546666-16615-4-git-send-email-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-04-18_17:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=1 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1703280000 definitions=main-1704180158 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2439 Lines: 92 If the func_tokens array uses the same indices as enum ima_hooks, policy_func_show can be a lot simpler, and the func_* enum becomes unnecessary. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 47 ++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index cfda5d7b17ec..158eafef64e8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -896,20 +896,14 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" }; -enum { - func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm, - func_module, func_firmware, func_post, - func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs, - func_policy -}; - static const char *const func_tokens[] = { + NULL, "FILE_CHECK", "MMAP_CHECK", "BPRM_CHECK", + "POST_SETATTR", "MODULE_CHECK", "FIRMWARE_CHECK", - "POST_SETATTR", "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK", "POLICY_CHECK" @@ -949,48 +943,21 @@ void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token] -#define ft(token) func_tokens[token] /* * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule */ static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func) { - char tbuf[64] = {0,}; + if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), func_tokens[func]); + else { + char tbuf[64] = {0,}; - switch (func) { - case FILE_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file)); - break; - case MMAP_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap)); - break; - case BPRM_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm)); - break; - case MODULE_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module)); - break; - case FIRMWARE_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware)); - break; - case POST_SETATTR: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post)); - break; - case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel)); - break; - case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs)); - break; - case POLICY_CHECK: - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy)); - break; - default: snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf); - break; } + seq_puts(m, " "); } -- 2.7.4