Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1164596AbdDXDrl (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Apr 2017 23:47:41 -0400 Received: from h2.hallyn.com ([78.46.35.8]:58098 "EHLO h2.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1164528AbdDXDrf (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Apr 2017 23:47:35 -0400 Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2017 22:47:32 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Matt Brown Cc: serge@hallyn.com, jmorris@namei.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jslaby@suse.com, corbet@lwn.net, keescook@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Message-ID: <20170424034732.GA1717@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20170423235417.12809-1-matt@nmatt.com> <20170423235417.12809-3-matt@nmatt.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170423235417.12809-3-matt@nmatt.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6806 Lines: 194 Quoting Matt Brown (matt@nmatt.com): > This introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled via > CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this control restricts > all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users. > > This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY. > > This patch would have prevented > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following > conditions: > * non-privileged container > * container run inside new user namespace > > Possible effects on userland: > > There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this > change. > See: > notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh > > However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the > Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the > same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this > opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS > features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the > Kconfig help message. > > Threat Model/Patch Rational: > > >From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY. > > | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it > | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in > | the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an > | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other > | processes within the same user's compromised session. > > So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow > that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security > boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su > or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file > descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries. > > This is also an excellent writeup about the issue: > > > When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability > CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally opened > the tty. > > Signed-off-by: Matt Brown Thanks. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > --- > Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++ > kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ > security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt > index bac23c1..c15c660 100644 > --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt > +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt > @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: > - sysctl_writes_strict > - tainted > - threads-max > +- tiocsti_restrict > - unknown_nmi_panic > - watchdog > - watchdog_thresh > @@ -987,6 +988,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly. > > ============================================================== > > +tiocsti_restrict: > + > +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented > +from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into otherprocesses > +which share a tty session. > + > +When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept > +the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into > +one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must > +have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl. > + > +When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability > +CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally > +opened the tty. > + > +The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the > +default value of tiocsti_restrict. > + > +============================================================== > + > unknown_nmi_panic: > > The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the > diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c > index 03d5ea2..5667a5e 100644 > --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c > +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c > @@ -2298,11 +2298,17 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) > * FIXME: may race normal receive processing > */ > > +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT); > + > static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p) > { > char ch, mbz = 0; > struct tty_ldisc *ld; > > + if (tiocsti_restrict && !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { > + pr_warn_ratelimited("TIOCSTI ioctl call blocked for non-privileged process\n"); > + return -EPERM; > + } > if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > return -EPERM; > if (get_user(ch, p)) > diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h > index d902d42..2fd7f49 100644 > --- a/include/linux/tty.h > +++ b/include/linux/tty.h > @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { > struct list_head list; > }; > > +extern int tiocsti_restrict; > + > /* tty magic number */ > #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401 > > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c > index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644 > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c > @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { > .extra2 = &two, > }, > #endif > +#if defined CONFIG_TTY > + { > + .procname = "tiocsti_restrict", > + .data = &tiocsti_restrict, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0644, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, > + .extra1 = &zero, > + .extra2 = &one, > + }, > +#endif > { > .procname = "ngroups_max", > .data = &ngroups_max, > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT > > If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. > > +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT > + bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection" > + default n > + help > + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands > + into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI > + ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > + > + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced > + unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). > + > + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. > + > config SECURITY > bool "Enable different security models" > depends on SYSFS > -- > 2.10.2