Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S376928AbdD2TSl (ORCPT ); Sat, 29 Apr 2017 15:18:41 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:48617 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1164741AbdD2TSb (ORCPT ); Sat, 29 Apr 2017 15:18:31 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Kirill Tkhai Cc: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , References: <149329634856.21195.14196911999722279118.stgit@localhost.localdomain> <87mvb16fv7.fsf@xmission.com> <12a73543-79ea-4bac-7e96-6ab237534af2@virtuozzo.com> <877f254yx0.fsf@xmission.com> Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2017 14:12:08 -0500 In-Reply-To: (Kirill Tkhai's message of "Fri, 28 Apr 2017 12:13:14 +0300") Message-ID: <8737crt4dz.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1d4Xsp-0001Yp-E6;;;mid=<8737crt4dz.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=67.3.233.227;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/37loCmr77hgL4Q7iKSp9MdaowxWPGZ0Q= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 67.3.233.227 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Kirill Tkhai X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 5305 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.03 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 2.6 (0.0%), b_tie_ro: 1.76 (0.0%), parse: 1.00 (0.0%), extract_message_metadata: 15 (0.3%), get_uri_detail_list: 5 (0.1%), tests_pri_-1000: 4.9 (0.1%), tests_pri_-950: 1.17 (0.0%), tests_pri_-900: 1.01 (0.0%), tests_pri_-400: 45 (0.8%), check_bayes: 44 (0.8%), b_tokenize: 18 (0.3%), b_tok_get_all: 14 (0.3%), b_comp_prob: 4.3 (0.1%), b_tok_touch_all: 4.7 (0.1%), b_finish: 0.66 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 956 (18.0%), check_dkim_signature: 0.98 (0.0%), check_dkim_adsp: 4.2 (0.1%), tests_pri_500: 4275 (80.6%), poll_dns_idle: 4268 (80.5%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] pid_ns: Introduce ioctl to set vector of ns_last_pid's on ns hierarhy X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 9890 Lines: 259 Kirill Tkhai writes: > On 27.04.2017 19:07, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Kirill Tkhai writes: >> >>> On 27.04.2017 18:15, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >>>> Kirill Tkhai writes: >>>> >>>>> On implementing of nested pid namespaces support in CRIU >>>>> (checkpoint-restore in userspace tool) we run into >>>>> the situation, that it's impossible to create a task with >>>>> specific NSpid effectively. After commit 49f4d8b93ccf >>>>> "pidns: Capture the user namespace and filter ns_last_pid" >>>>> it is impossible to set ns_last_pid on any pid namespace, >>>>> except task's active pid_ns (before the commit it was possible >>>>> to write to pid_ns_for_children). Thus, if a restored task >>>>> in a container has more than one pid_ns levels, the restorer >>>>> code must have a task helper for every pid namespace >>>>> of the task's pid_ns hierarhy. >>>>> >>>>> This is a big problem, because of communication with >>>>> a helper for every pid_ns in the hierarchy is not cheap. >>>>> It's not performance-good as it implies many helpers wakeups >>>>> to create a single task (independently, how you communicate >>>>> with the helpers). This patch tries to decide the problem. >>>> >>>> I see the problem and we definitely need to do something. >>>> Your patch does appear better than what we have been doing. >>>> So a tenative conceptual ack. >>>> >>>> At the same time it is legitimate to claim that the use of >>>> task_active_pid_ns(current) rather than >>>> current->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children is a regression caused by the >>>> above commit. So we can fix the original issue as well. >>>> >>>> I do have to ask when was this problem discovered, and why did it take >>>> so long to discover? The regeression happened nearly 5 years ago. >>>> >>>> Was CRIU already using this? >>> >>> CRIU uses ns_last_pid, but we never had nested pid namespace hierarchy. >>> When there is only one level of pid namespaces, then active pid namespace >>> is the save as pid_ns_for_children, so we never faced with this >>> problem. >> >> Ok. So not a regression then. >> >>> Now we're working on Docker support, and its recent versions create nested >>> pid namespaces (I have no information, when they begun to do that). So, >>> we met this problem. >>> >>>> It looks like the fix is a one line low danger change to >>>> /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid. With a low danger as pid_ns_for_children >>>> rarely differs from task_active_pid_ns(). >>>> >>>> >>>>> It introduces a new pid_ns ioctl(NS_SET_LAST_PID_VEC), >>>>> which allows to write a vector of last pids on pid_ns hierarchy. >>>>> The vector is passed as array of pids in struct ns_ioc_pid_vec, >>>>> written in reverse order. The first number corresponds to >>>>> the opened namespace ns_last_pid, the second is to its parent, etc. >>>>> So, if you have the pid namespaces hierarchy like: >>>>> >>>>> pid_ns1 (grand father) >>>>> | >>>>> v >>>>> pid_ns2 (father) >>>>> | >>>>> v >>>>> pid_ns3 (child) >>>>> >>>>> and the pid_ns3 is open, then the corresponding vector will be >>>>> {last_ns_pid3, last_ns_pid2, last_ns_pid1}. This vector may be >>>>> short and it may contain less levels. For example, >>>>> {last_ns_pid3, last_ns_pid2} or even {last_ns_pid3}, in dependence >>>>> of which levels you want to populate. >>>>> >>>>> v3: Use __u32 in uapi instead of unsigned int. >>>>> >>>>> v2: Kill pid_ns->child_reaper check as it's impossible to have >>>>> such a pid namespace file open. >>>>> Use generic namespaces ioctl() number. >>>>> Pass pids as array, not as a string. >>>>> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai >>>>> --- >>>>> fs/nsfs.c | 5 +++++ >>>>> include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 12 ++++++++++++ >>>>> include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 7 +++++++ >>>>> kernel/pid_namespace.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>>> 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+) >>>>> >>>>> diff --git a/fs/nsfs.c b/fs/nsfs.c >>>>> index 323f492e0822..f669a1552003 100644 >>>>> --- a/fs/nsfs.c >>>>> +++ b/fs/nsfs.c >>>>> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> +#include >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> >>>>> @@ -186,6 +187,10 @@ static long ns_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl, >>>>> argp = (uid_t __user *) arg; >>>>> uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), user_ns->owner); >>>>> return put_user(uid, argp); >>>>> + case NS_SET_LAST_PID_VEC: >>>>> + if (ns->ops->type != CLONE_NEWPID) >>>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>>> + return pidns_set_last_pid_vec(ns, (void *)arg); >>>>> default: >>>>> return -ENOTTY; >>>>> } >>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h >>>>> index c2a989dee876..c8dc4173a4e8 100644 >>>>> --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h >>>>> +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h >>>>> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> +#include >>>> >>>> No need for the extra include and slowing down the build. Just >>>> declare the relevant structures. >>> >>> So, I'll write just: >>> >>> struct ns_ioc_pid_vec; >>> >>> instead of that. >>> >>>>> >>>>> struct pidmap { >>>>> atomic_t nr_free; >>>>> @@ -103,6 +104,17 @@ static inline int reboot_pid_ns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int cmd) >>>>> } >>>>> #endif /* CONFIG_PID_NS */ >>>>> >>>>> +#if defined(CONFIG_PID_NS) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) >>>>> +extern long pidns_set_last_pid_vec(struct ns_common *ns, >>>>> + struct ns_ioc_pid_vec __user *vec); >>>>> +#else /* CONFIG_PID_NS && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ >>>>> +static inline long pidns_set_last_pid_vec(struct ns_common *ns, >>>>> + struct ns_ioc_pid_vec __user *vec) >>>>> +{ >>>>> + return -ENOTTY; >>>>> +} >>>>> +#endif /* CONFIG_PID_NS && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ >>>> >>>> Just CONFIG_PID_NS please. Either this is good enough for everyone who >>>> has pid namespace support enabled or it isn't. >>> >>> Great, if it's so. For me it looks better too. >>> >>>>> extern struct pid_namespace *task_active_pid_ns(struct task_struct *tsk); >>>>> void pidhash_init(void); >>>>> void pidmap_init(void); >>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h b/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h >>>>> index 1a3ca79f466b..1254b02a47fa 100644 >>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h >>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h >>>>> @@ -14,5 +14,12 @@ >>>>> #define NS_GET_NSTYPE _IO(NSIO, 0x3) >>>>> /* Get owner UID (in the caller's user namespace) for a user namespace */ >>>>> #define NS_GET_OWNER_UID _IO(NSIO, 0x4) >>>>> +/* Set a vector of ns_last_pid for a pid namespace stack */ >>>>> +#define NS_SET_LAST_PID_VEC _IO(NSIO, 0x5) >>>>> + >>>>> +struct ns_ioc_pid_vec { >>>>> + __u32 nr; >>>>> + pid_t pid[0]; >>>>> +}; >>>>> >>>>> #endif /* __LINUX_NSFS_H */ >>>>> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c >>>>> index de461aa0bf9a..08b5fef23534 100644 >>>>> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c >>>>> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c >>>>> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> #include >>>>> +#include >>>>> >>>>> struct pid_cache { >>>>> int nr_ids; >>>>> @@ -428,6 +429,40 @@ static struct ns_common *pidns_get_parent(struct ns_common *ns) >>>>> return &get_pid_ns(pid_ns)->ns; >>>>> } >>>>> >>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE >>>>> +long pidns_set_last_pid_vec(struct ns_common *ns, >>>>> + struct ns_ioc_pid_vec __user *vec) >>>>> +{ >>>>> + struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = to_pid_ns(ns); >>>>> + pid_t pid, __user *pid_ptr; >>>>> + u32 nr; >>>>> + >>>>> + if (get_user(nr, &vec->nr)) >>>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>>> + if (nr > 32 || nr < 1) >>>> >>>> The maximum needs not to be hard coded. >>> >>> Ah, I've missed MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL, thanks. >>> >>>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>>> + >>>>> + pid_ptr = &vec->pid[0]; >>>> >>>> All of the rest of the vector needs to be read in, in one go. >>> >>> Hm, Oleg said we shouldn't allocate a memory for that. Should >>> I create array of MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL pids on stack? >> >> *scratches head* >> >> The really important part is that we perform all of the permission >> checks before we perform the rest of the work. >> >> I would like to be able to say that the permission checks and >> the rest of it all happen atomically. Which requires copying the >> data into kernel memory and sanitizing it (aka all checks) before >> we apply the changes. > > This way, we better check the permissions on the top pid namespace > of the passed vector, because every children's pid_ns->user_ns is > the same as its parent's, or it's descendant. In practice this makes sense and is a useful simplification. Looking at your suggesting I am noticing we don't actually enforce this constraint, and that with careful usage of setns I can get around that. This seems like a hazard for kernel developers and not at all useful for userspace developers. So it looks like we need a patch to enforce this constraint. Patch to fix this issue in a moment. >> "BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(u32) * MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL < 64);" if we are > > What does this check mean? Why do we have to limit minimal MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL? That should have been paranenthesized as: BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(u32) * MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL) < 128); or possibly writen as: BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(on_stack_array) < 128); The point being that if someone changes MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL and the stack usage goes up noticably we have a warning, and then someone can determine if the array is still small enough to fit on the stack or if it needs to be kmalloced. The goal is not to leave a trap for maintainers in the future. Eric