Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751256AbdFBPAD (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Jun 2017 11:00:03 -0400 Received: from frisell.zx2c4.com ([192.95.5.64]:55545 "EHLO frisell.zx2c4.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751128AbdFBPAB (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Jun 2017 11:00:01 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 16:59:56 +0200 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: get_random_bytes returns bad randomness before seeding is complete To: Stephan Mueller , "Theodore Ts'o" , Linux Crypto Mailing List , LKML , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6888 Lines: 155 Hi folks, This email is about an issue with get_random_bytes(), the CSPRNG used inside the kernel for generating keys and nonces and whatnot. However, I will begin with an aside: /dev/urandom will return bad randomness before its seeded, rather than blocking, and despite years and years of discussion and bike shedding, this behavior hasn't changed, and the vast majority of cryptographers and security experts remain displeased. It _should_ block until its been seeded for the first time, just like the new getrandom() syscall, and this important bug fix (which is not a real api break) should be backported to all stable kernels. (Userspace doesn't even have a reliable way of determining whether or not it's been seeded!) Yes, yes, you have arguments for why you're keeping this pathological, but you're still wrong, and this api is still a bug. Forcing userspace architectures to work around your bug, as your arguments usually go, is disquieting. Anyway, that's not what this email is about, but given that as a backdrop, here's a different-but-related, and perhaps more petulant, issue... The problem this email intends to address is this: void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { #if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0 if (!crng_ready()) printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); #endif ... extract_crng(buf); Or, on older kernels: void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { #if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0 if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " "with %d bits of entropy available\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total); #endif trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0); } As the printk implies, it's possible for get_random_bytes() to be called before it's seeded. Why was that helpful printk put behind an ifdef? I suspect because people would see the lines in their dmesg and write emails like this one to the list. I anticipate an argument coming from the never-block /dev/urandom cartel that goes something along the lines of, "get_random_bytes() is only called in paths initiated by a syscall; therefore, userspace must ensure /dev/urandom, which is the same pool as get_random_bytes, has been properly seeded, before making any syscalls that might lead to get_random_bytes() being called." If you've already given up on the general initiative of trying to urge them to make /dev/urandom block until seeded, then this might seem like a reasonable argument. If /dev/urandom is broken, it doesn't matter if get_random_bytes() is broken too, if the required work-around for one is the same as for the other. But the premise is flawed. get_random_bytes() can be called before any syscalls are made, before userspace even has an opportunity to ensure /dev/urandom is seeded. That's what that printk in the ifdef is all about. Bad news bears. Grepping through the source tree for get_random_bytes, I just opened a few files at random to see what the deal was. Here's one: drivers/net/ieee802154/at86rf230.c: static int at86rf230_probe(struct spi_device *spi) { ... get_random_bytes(csma_seed, ARRAY_SIZE(csma_seed)); No clue what this driver is for or if it actually needs good randomness, but using get_random_bytes in a hardware probe function can happen prior to userspace's ability to seed. arch/s390/crypto/prng.c seems to call get_random_bytes on module load, which can happen pre-userspace, for seeding some kind of RNG of its own. net/ipv6/addrconf.c: static void __ipv6_regen_rndid(struct inet6_dev *idev) { regen: get_random_bytes(idev->rndid, sizeof(idev->rndid)); This is in the networking stack when bringing up an interface and assigning randomly assigned v6 addresses. While you might argue that userspace is required for networking, remember that the kernel actually has the ability to initiate networking all on its own, before userspace; the kernel even has its own dhcp client! Yowza. In fact, on that note: net/ipv4/ipconfig.c: static int __init ic_open_devs(void) { ... get_random_bytes(&d->xid, sizeof(__be32)); And so on and so on and so on. If you grep the source as I did, you'll find there's no shortage of head-scratchers. "Hmmm," you ask yourself, "could this be called before userspace has ensured that /dev/urandom is seeded? do we actually _need_ good randomness here, or does it not matter?" I guess you could try to reason about each and every one of them -- you might even have those same questions about the silly examples I pasted above -- but that one-by-one methodology seems excessively fragile and arduous. There must have been a developer who thought about this at least once before, because random.c does have a callback notifier mechanism for drivers to learn when they can safely call get_random_bytes -- add_random_ready_callback. However, it's only used by ONE driver -- the drbg in crypto/. It's pretty clunky to use, and there's no reasonable to way replace every single usage of get_random_bytes with complicated callback infrastructure. Instead, get_random_bytes simply needs to always return good randomness. But this is complicated to do inside the kernel. We can't simply have it block until seeded, because we might not be in process context and therefore cannot sleep, and introducing a spin for something that could take a while is untenable too. There might be some hope, however. Recent kernels now have a very fast urandom seeding, which moves the seed-ready-point to be much early during boot. This is still not early enough to just "do nothing", but early enough that there's room for a good solution: For builtin modules, we defer all __init calls to after seeding of drivers that use get_random_bytes. That is to say, rather than using add_random_ready_callback one by one in an ad-hoc fashion with every call site that needs good randomness, we just defer loading those entire modules until an add_random_ready_callback callback. We might need to explicitly opt-in to this -- by introducing an `after_urandom_init(..)`, for example, to replace module_init in these cases -- or perhaps there's a way to automatically detect and defer. For external modules, it's much easier; we simply have request_module() block until after seeding is complete. This function is already a blocking one, so that's not an issue. And it'd ensure that things like virtual network drivers that are dynamically loaded and use get_random_bytes, such as vxlan or wireguard, simply block on `ip link add ...`, which would be the desired behavior. Alternatively, I'm open to other solutions people might come up with. Thoughts? Jason