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Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 20:41:34 -0400
From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
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        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the
 RNG is ready before using
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 <20170606174804.31124-6-Jason@zx2c4.com>
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On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:56PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
> dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
> from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
> isn't relevant in assessing this.

The use in keys/big_key is _being_ removed, so this commit is
dependent on that commit landing, correct?  (Order matters, because
otherwise we don't want to potentially screw up doing a kernel bisect
and causing their kernel to deadlock during the boot while they are
trying to track down an unreleated problem.)

       	  	     		   - Ted