Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751942AbdFHNsQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Jun 2017 09:48:16 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:42496 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751553AbdFHNsK (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Jun 2017 09:48:10 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 1C286A6E1A Authentication-Results: ext-mx09.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx09.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dhowells@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com 1C286A6E1A Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 06/23] KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() fails From: David Howells To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 14:48:03 +0100 Message-ID: <149692968329.11452.1023488254368799056.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <149692963884.11452.7673998701432248814.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <149692963884.11452.7673998701432248814.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.38]); Thu, 08 Jun 2017 13:48:05 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1427 Lines: 47 From: Eric Biggers In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new error label at which the keyring reference is dropped. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells --- security/keys/process_keys.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 2217dfec7996..86bced9fdbdf 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -809,15 +809,14 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto error2; } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) { - key_put(keyring); ret = 0; - goto error2; + goto error3; } /* we've got a keyring - now to install it */ ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring); if (ret < 0) - goto error2; + goto error3; commit_creds(new); mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex); @@ -827,6 +826,8 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) okay: return ret; +error3: + key_put(keyring); error2: mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex); error: