Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751764AbdFINQ6 (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Jun 2017 09:16:58 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:41485 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751538AbdFINQ5 (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Jun 2017 09:16:57 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM From: Mimi Zohar To: Kees Cook Cc: Matt Brown , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , LKML , linux-security-module , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 09:16:32 -0400 In-Reply-To: References: <20170608034349.31876-1-matt@nmatt.com> <20170608034349.31876-2-matt@nmatt.com> <94ba5ebb-952b-2037-799e-07306629a6f9@nmatt.com> <1497003507.21594.177.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable x-cbid: 17060913-0040-0000-0000-0000032B5945 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17060913-0041-0000-0000-00000CA56915 Message-Id: <1497014192.21594.185.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-06-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1703280000 definitions=main-1706090234 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1353 Lines: 34 On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 05:55 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > >> >> > >> >> * Issues: > >> >> * Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run > >> >> malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code' > >> > > >> > What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but > >> > having interpreters installed? > >> > > >> > >> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While > >> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a > >> difference under the TPE threat model. > >> > >> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard > >> problem for TPE. > > > > You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I > > posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the > > python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts > > themselves to be executed. > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/ > > Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made > into a configurable list? I updated shebang, but didn't bother to post it, as nobody seemed to be interested at the time.  The updated version already has support for the configurable list. Re-posting ... Mimi