Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751927AbdFPWYJ (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Jun 2017 18:24:09 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:43697 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751812AbdFPWYG (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Jun 2017 18:24:06 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities To: "Serge E. Hallyn" References: <20170507092105.GA67584@inn.lkp.intel.com> <20170508044408.GA11400@mail.hallyn.com> <20170508181156.GA23112@mail.hallyn.com> <9f80188c-df03-066a-5dac-785cc711d064@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170613171818.GA9070@mail.hallyn.com> <74e490f3-3c47-abfa-86ae-0fa0d1ddb43a@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170613235521.GC15685@mail.hallyn.com> <20170615030543.GA8979@mail.hallyn.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Masami Ichikawa , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, lkp@01.org, xiaolong.ye@intel.com, LKML , Mimi Zohar From: Stefan Berger Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 18:24:00 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170615030543.GA8979@mail.hallyn.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17061622-0020-0000-0000-00000C2DD8BD X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00007245; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000214; SDB=6.00875800; UDB=6.00436089; IPR=6.00655889; BA=6.00005425; NDR=6.00000001; ZLA=6.00000005; ZF=6.00000009; ZB=6.00000000; ZP=6.00000000; ZH=6.00000000; ZU=6.00000002; MB=3.00015857; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2017-06-16 22:24:04 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17061622-0021-0000-0000-00005CD33D4E Message-Id: <6b3431cf-d4cf-f92c-d3c8-073d199fb580@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-06-16_12:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1703280000 definitions=main-1706160381 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2731 Lines: 56 On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: >>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com): >>>> If all extended >>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be >>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not >>>> sure whether that's possible). >>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning. >>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have >>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to >> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it. >> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get(). > That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with > 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as > uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the > xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then > security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr > and look for those. Am I overlooking one? So that sounds like a child would 'inherit' the value of an xattr from the closest parent if it doesn't have one itself. I guess it would depend on the xattr whether that should apply? And removing an xattr becomes difficult then if the parent container's xattr always shines through... > >> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that > I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original > email? "security.capability[uid=2000]" > >> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over >> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same >> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work. > Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if > you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a > bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a > copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different > user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable? So you think it's a good idea? I am not sure when I would get to it, though... Stefan > >> Otherwise it would be good if the value was wrapped in a data >> structure use by all xattrs, but that doesn't seem to be the case, >> either. So I guess we have to go into each type of value structure >> and add a uid field there. >> >>> namespace any security.* xattrs. Wouldn't be automatically enabled >>> for anything but ima and capabilities, but we could make the infrastructure >>> generic and re-usable. >>>