Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
To: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
References: <20170508044408.GA11400@mail.hallyn.com>
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Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, xiaolong.ye@intel.com, lkp@01.org,
        Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 08:19:42 -0400
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On 06/20/2017 01:42 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>>
>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>>>>   If all extended
>>>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea.  Do you have
>>>>>>> a patch to that effect?  We might even be able to generalize that to
>>>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>>>> The xattr_handler's  take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>>>> That may be ok though.  Assume the host created a container with
>>>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>>>> uid for root.  If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo.  Or, it can do a listxattr
>>>>> and look for those.  Am I overlooking one?
>>>>>
>>>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>>>> email?  "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>>>
>>>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>>>> Hm.  Yeah.  But really how many setups are there like that?  I.e. if
>>>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>>>> copy.  What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
>>>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>>>> security.capability:
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>>> Thanks!
>>>
>>>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>>>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>>>
>>>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>>>> host (init_user_ns).
>>>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>>>> root , e.g. 1000.
>>>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>>>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>>>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>>>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>>>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>>> This looks very close to what we want.  One exception - we do want
>>> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
>>> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
>>> namespace.  In that case the name should be rewritten to be
>>> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>>>
>>> Eric,
>>>
>>> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree.  Given that, would you
>>> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach?  If
>>> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
>>> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
>> Agreed.  I will take a look.  I also want to see how all of this works
>> in the context of stackable filesystems.  As that is the one case that
>> looked like it could be a problem case in your current patchset.
>>
> Apropos stackable filesystems [cc some overlayfs folks], is there any
> way that parts of this work could be generalized towards ns aware
> trusted@uid.* xattr?

I am at least removing all string comparison with xattr names from the 
core code and move the enabled xattr names into a list. For the 
security.* extended attribute names we would enumerated the enabled ones 
in that list, only security.capability for now. I am not sure how the 
trusted.* space works.

     Stefan

>
> With overlayfs, files are written to underlying fs with mounter's
> credentials. How this affects v3 security capabilities and how exactly
> security xattrs are handled in overtlayfs I'm not sure. Vivek?
>
> But, if we had an infrastructure to store trusted@<rootid> xattr, then
> unprivileged overlayfs mount would become a very reachable goal.
> Much closer goal then loop mounting...
>
> Amir.
>