Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752800AbdGHJYf (ORCPT ); Sat, 8 Jul 2017 05:24:35 -0400 Received: from mail-wr0-f193.google.com ([209.85.128.193]:33718 "EHLO mail-wr0-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752636AbdGHJYb (ORCPT ); Sat, 8 Jul 2017 05:24:31 -0400 Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 11:24:26 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Brijesh Singh , Toshimitsu Kani , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Matt Fleming , Alexander Potapenko , "H. Peter Anvin" , Larry Woodman , Jonathan Corbet , Joerg Roedel , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Ingo Molnar , Andrey Ryabinin , Dave Young , Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Boris Ostrovsky , Dmitry Vyukov , Juergen Gross , Thomas Gleixner , Paolo Bonzini Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Message-ID: <20170708092426.prf7xmmnv6xvdqx4@gmail.com> References: <20170707133804.29711.1616.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170707133804.29711.1616.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 818 Lines: 22 * Tom Lendacky wrote: > This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME) > feature. I'm wondering, what's the typical performance hit to DRAM access latency when SME is enabled? On that same note, if the performance hit is noticeable I'd expect SME to not be enabled in native kernels typically - but still it looks like a useful hardware feature. Since it's controlled at the page table level, have you considered allowing SME-activated vmas via mmap(), even on kernels that are otherwise not using encrypted DRAM? One would think that putting encryption keys into such encrypted RAM regions would generally improve robustness against various physical space attacks that want to extract keys but don't have full control of the CPU. Thanks, Ingo