Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756126AbdGKWTu (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jul 2017 18:19:50 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:34053 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756099AbdGKWTs (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jul 2017 18:19:48 -0400 Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 15:19:30 -0700 From: Ram Pai To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, arnd@arndb.de, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen , mingo@redhat.com, paulus@samba.org, aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com Subject: Re: [RFC v5 12/38] mm: ability to disable execute permission on a key at creation Reply-To: Ram Pai References: <1499289735-14220-1-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com> <1499289735-14220-13-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com> <3bd2ffd4-33ad-ce23-3db1-d1292e69ca9b@intel.com> <1499808577.2865.30.camel@kernel.crashing.org> <20170711215105.GA5542@ram.oc3035372033.ibm.com> <1499810936.2865.32.camel@kernel.crashing.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1499810936.2865.32.camel@kernel.crashing.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-12-10) X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17071122-0024-0000-0000-000016D5786D X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00007351; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000214; SDB=6.00886205; UDB=6.00442341; IPR=6.00666355; BA=6.00005468; NDR=6.00000001; ZLA=6.00000005; ZF=6.00000009; ZB=6.00000000; ZP=6.00000000; ZH=6.00000000; ZU=6.00000002; MB=3.00016185; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2017-07-11 22:19:44 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17071122-0025-0000-0000-00004BCA2F8C Message-Id: <20170711221929.GC5542@ram.oc3035372033.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-07-11_12:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1706020000 definitions=main-1707110354 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1868 Lines: 39 On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 08:08:56AM +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > On Tue, 2017-07-11 at 14:51 -0700, Ram Pai wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 07:29:37AM +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > > > On Tue, 2017-07-11 at 11:11 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > > On 07/05/2017 02:21 PM, Ram Pai wrote: > > > > > Currently sys_pkey_create() provides the ability to disable read > > > > > and write permission on the key, at creation. powerpc has the > > > > > hardware support to disable execute on a pkey as well.This patch > > > > > enhances the interface to let disable execute at key creation > > > > > time. x86 does not allow this. Hence the next patch will add > > > > > ability in x86 to return error if PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE is > > > > > specified. > > > > > > That leads to the question... How do you tell userspace. > > > > > > (apologies if I missed that in an existing patch in the series) > > > > > > How do we inform userspace of the key capabilities ? There are at least > > > two things userspace may want to know already: > > > > > > - What protection bits are supported for a key > > > > the userspace is the one which allocates the keys and enables/disables the > > protection bits on the key. the kernel is just a facilitator. Now if the > > use space wants to know the current permissions on a given key, it can > > just read the AMR/PKRU register on powerpc/intel respectively. > > You misunderstand. How does userspace knows on a given system whether > execute permission control is supported for keys ? Ah..sorry. did not catch that part. Yes the current patch set does not make that information available. The indirect way of find this out is, to try to allocate a key with execute-disable permission and decide based on the pass/fail status. we can expose that information through a procfs/sysfs interface. RP