Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753939AbdGLRDu (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Jul 2017 13:03:50 -0400 Received: from h2.hallyn.com ([78.46.35.8]:49538 "EHLO h2.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753514AbdGLRDs (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Jul 2017 13:03:48 -0400 Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:03:46 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Stefan Berger , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, lkp@01.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, tycho@docker.com, serge@hallyn.com, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, christian.brauner@mailbox.org, amir73il@gmail.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces Message-ID: <20170712170346.GA17974@mail.hallyn.com> References: <1499785511-17192-1-git-send-email-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1499785511-17192-2-git-send-email-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87mv89iy7q.fsf@xmission.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <87mv89iy7q.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1097 Lines: 27 Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): > Stefan Berger <"Stefan Bergerstefanb"@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes: > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn > > It doesn't look like this is coming through Serge so I don't see how > the Signed-off-by tag is legtimate. This is mostly explained by the fact that there have been a *lot* of changes, many of them discussed in private emails. > >From the replies to this it doesn't look like Serge has reviewed this > version either. > > I am disappointed that all of my concerns about technical feasibility > remain unaddressed. Can you re-state those, or give a link to them? I'd really like to get to a point where unprivileged containers can start using filecaps - at this point if that means having an extra temporary file format based on my earlier patchset while we hash this out, that actually seems worthwhile. But it would of course be ideal if we could do the name based caps right in the first place. -serge