Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751471AbdGRNVb (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Jul 2017 09:21:31 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:44273 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751399AbdGRNV3 (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Jul 2017 09:21:29 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces To: Vivek Goyal References: <1499785511-17192-1-git-send-email-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1499785511-17192-2-git-send-email-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170717185811.GC15794@redhat.com> <7a39e8a6-a33b-f6a8-3fd5-6211c075ab91@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170718114849.GA8233@redhat.com> <55971eea-fde2-439a-2fe5-d0ae5e80bc22@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170718123009.GB8233@redhat.com> Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, lkp@01.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, tycho@docker.com, serge@hallyn.com, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, christian.brauner@mailbox.org, amir73il@gmail.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com From: Stefan Berger Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 09:21:22 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170718123009.GB8233@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17071813-0008-0000-0000-000008414619 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00007381; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000214; SDB=6.00889339; UDB=6.00444219; IPR=6.00669512; BA=6.00005479; NDR=6.00000001; ZLA=6.00000005; ZF=6.00000009; ZB=6.00000000; ZP=6.00000000; ZH=6.00000000; ZU=6.00000002; MB=3.00016261; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2017-07-18 13:21:27 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17071813-0009-0000-0000-0000432477D1 Message-Id: X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-07-18_05:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=9 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1706020000 definitions=main-1707180209 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6353 Lines: 150 On 07/18/2017 08:30 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 08:05:18AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >> On 07/18/2017 07:48 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote: >>> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 04:50:22PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >>>> On 07/17/2017 02:58 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote: >>>>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:05:11AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >>>>> >>>>> [..] >>>>>> +/* >>>>>> + * xattr_list_userns_rewrite - Rewrite list of xattr names for user namespaces >>>>>> + * or determine needed size for attribute list >>>>>> + * in case size == 0 >>>>>> + * >>>>>> + * In a user namespace we do not present all extended attributes to the >>>>>> + * user. We filter out those that are in the list of userns supported xattr. >>>>>> + * Besides that we filter out those with @uid= when there is no mapping >>>>>> + * for that uid in the current user namespace. >>>>>> + * >>>>>> + * @list: list of 0-byte separated xattr names >>>>>> + * @size: the size of the list; may be 0 to determine needed list size >>>>>> + * @list_maxlen: allocated buffer size of list >>>>>> + */ >>>>>> +static ssize_t >>>>>> +xattr_list_userns_rewrite(char *list, ssize_t size, size_t list_maxlen) >>>>>> +{ >>>>>> + char *nlist = NULL; >>>>>> + size_t s_off, len, nlen; >>>>>> + ssize_t d_off; >>>>>> + char *name, *newname; >>>>>> + >>>>>> + if (!list || size < 0 || current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) >>>>> size will never be less than 0 here. Only caller calls this function only >>>>> if size is >0. So can we remove this? >>>> Correct. >>>> >>>>> What about case of "!list". So if user space called listxattr(foo, NULL, >>>>> 0), we want to return the size of buffer as if all the xattrs will be >>>>> returned to user space. But in practice we probably will filter out some >>>>> xattrs so actually returned string will be smaller than size reported >>>>> previously. >>>> This case of size=0 is a problem in userns. Depending on the mapping of the >>>> userid's the list can expand. A security.foo@uid=100 can become >>>> security.foo@uid=100000, if the mapping is set up so that uid 100 on the >>>> host becomes uid 100000 inside the container. So for now we only have >>>> security.capability and the way I solved this is by allocating a 65k buffer >>>> when calling from a userns. In this buffer where we gather the xattr names >>>> and then walk them to determine the size that's needed for the buffer by >>>> simulating the rewriting. It's not nice but I don't know of any other >>>> solution. >>> Hi Stefan, >>> >>> For the case of size==0, why don't we iterate through all the xattr, >>> filter them, remap them and then return the size to process in user >>> namespace. That should fix this? I thought that's what >> >> For the size==0 we need a temp. buffer where the raw xattr names are written >> to so that the xattr_list_userns_rewrite() can actually rewrite what the >> filesystem drivers returned. > I am probably missing something, but for the case of size==0, we don't > have to copy all xattrs. We just need to determine size. So we can walk > through each xattr, remap it and add to the size. I mean there should not > be a need to allocate this 65K buffer. Just enough space needed to be > able to store remapped xattr. > > You are already doing it in xattr_parse_uid_from_kuid(). It returns the > buffer containing remapped xattr. So we should be able to just determine > the size and free the buffer. And do it for all the xattrs returned by > filesystem. > > What am I missing? The problem is that each filesystem has a function that collects the xattr names. These functions only return the needed size if size==0 and don't write anything into a buffer. If the buffer is empty or there is no buffer, I have nothing to remap and calculate size for. So I pass a buffer large enough to hold the xattr names to the filesystem functions so I can then subsequently walk the xattrs and remap them. The remapping only needs to be done in non-init_user_ns since there the uid parts (@uid=1000) may need to be rewritten and most importantly, the size of the needed buffer can increase, depending on how the uid mappings are. I don't want to extend every filesystem's xattr name gathering function... Stefan > > Vivek > >> Not knowing exactly how big that buffer should >> be, I allocate 65k for it. From what I read there is a 64k limit on the vfs >> layer for xattrs, probably including xattr values. So 65k would for sure be >> enough also if each one of the xattr names becomes bigger. >> >> @@ -922,10 +947,20 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, >> size_t size, bool rewrite) >> { >> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); >> ssize_t error; >> + bool getsize = false; >> >> error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry); >> if (error) >> return error; >> + >> + if (!size) { >> + if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) { >> + size = 65 * 1024; >> + list = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); >> + } >> + getsize = true; >> + } >> + >> if (inode->i_op->listxattr && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { >> error = -EOPNOTSUPP; >> error = inode->i_op->listxattr(dentry, list, size); >> @@ -937,6 +972,9 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t >> size, bool rewrite) >> if (error > 0 && rewrite) >> error = xattr_list_userns_rewrite(list, error, size); >> >> + if (getsize) >> + kfree(list); >> + >> return error; >> } >> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_listxattr); >> >> >> Stefan >> >>> xattr_list_userns_rewrite() was doing. But looks like this logic will not >>> kick in for the case of size==0 due to "!list" condition. >>> >>> Also we could probably replace "!list" with "!size" wheverever required. >>> Its little easy to read and understand. >>> >>> For the other case where some xattrs can get filtered out and we report >>> a buffer size bigger than actually needed, I am hoping that its acceptable >>> and none of the existing users are broken. >>> >>> Thanks >>> Vivek >>> -- >>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in >>> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org >>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >>>