Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932417AbdGSVXz (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:23:55 -0400 Received: from fieldses.org ([173.255.197.46]:58878 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932305AbdGSVXx (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:23:53 -0400 Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:23:53 -0400 From: Bruce Fields To: Mimi Zohar Cc: jlayton@redhat.com, Jeff Layton , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Dmitry Kasatkin , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for assessment Message-ID: <20170719212353.GB5449@fieldses.org> References: <1499446642.4967.3.camel@poochiereds.net> <1499448249.3130.143.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1499449777.4852.3.camel@redhat.com> <1499457558.3130.173.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1499459718.4852.8.camel@redhat.com> <1499688612.6034.111.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1499822252.26839.5.camel@redhat.com> <1499862021.3904.23.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20170712143504.GB31196@fieldses.org> <1499882210.3426.47.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <1499882210.3426.47.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1566 Lines: 40 On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 01:56:50PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 10:35 -0400, Bruce Fields wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 08:20:21AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > Right, currently the only way of knowing is by looking at the IMA > > > measurement list to see if modified files are re-measured or, as you > > > said, by looking at the code. > > > > Who's actually using this, and do they do any kind of checks, or > > document the filesystem-specific limitations? > > Knowing who is using it and how it is being used is the big question. >  I only hear about it when there are problems. > > Over the years, there have been a number of Linux Security Summit > (LSS) talks, which have been mostly about embedded systems or locked > down systems, not so much for generic systems. > > Examples include: Thanks, I skimmed a couple. Hard to tell, but it sounds like they need this to work. I wonder if they're getting this right. It'd be easy enough to test for. --b. > > - Design and Implementation of a Security Architecture for Critical > Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems - David Safford, GE 2016 > > - IMA/EVM: Real Applications for Embedded Networking Systems - Petko > Manolov, Konsulko Group, and Mark Baushke, Juniper Networks 2015 > > - CC3: An Identity Attested Linux Security Supervisor Architecture >  - Greg Wettstein, IDfusion 2015 > > - The Linux Integrity Subsystem and TPM-based Network Endpoint > Assessment - Andreas Steffen, HSR University of Applied Sciences > Rapperswil, Switzerland 2012 > > Mimi