Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751662AbdG0S3Z (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Jul 2017 14:29:25 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:40986 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751461AbdG0S3Y (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Jul 2017 14:29:24 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 4E00CD64B3 Authentication-Results: ext-mx10.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx10.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=david@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: INVPCID support To: Paolo Bonzini , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org References: <1501161639-9707-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> From: David Hildenbrand Organization: Red Hat GmbH Message-ID: <0b82ca85-7b3e-9dc4-a102-24d0e9033dcd@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 20:29:21 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1501161639-9707-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.39]); Thu, 27 Jul 2017 18:29:23 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3794 Lines: 123 On 27.07.2017 15:20, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > Expose the "Enable INVPCID" secondary execution control to the guest > and properly reflect the exit reason. > > In addition, before this patch the guest was always running with > INVPCID enabled, causing pcid.flat's "Test on INVPCID when disabled" > test to fail. Did you wanted to send "KVM: nVMX: do not fill vm_exit_intr_error_code in prepare_vmcs12" I can spot on kvm/queue? (but sent this patch twice instead?) > > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini > --- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > index ed43fd824264..9c3c6c524430 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > @@ -8189,6 +8189,10 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) > * table is L0's fault. > */ > return false; > + case EXIT_REASON_INVPCID: > + return > + nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID) && > + nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING); (why the extra line after the return ?) > case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD: > return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING); > case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV: > @@ -9440,7 +9444,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > { > - struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; > struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); > u32 secondary_exec_ctl = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx); > > @@ -9459,15 +9462,27 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > } > } > > - /* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */ > - best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0); > - if (vmx_invpcid_supported() && > - (!best || !(best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) || > - !guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu))) { > - secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID; > + if (vmx_invpcid_supported()) { > + /* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */ > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0); > + bool invpcid_enabled = > + best && best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID) && I thought parentheses are recommended around &, but I am usually wrong about these things :) > + guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu); > > - if (best) > - best->ebx &= ~bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID); > + if (!invpcid_enabled) { > + secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID; > + if (best) (thinking loud: only relevant if !guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu)) > + best->ebx &= ~bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID); > + } Can't we rewrite that a little bit, avoiding that "best" handling (introducing guest_cpuid_disable_invpcid() and guest_cpuid_has_invpcid()) bool invpcid_enabled = guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu) && guest_cpuid_has_invpcid(); if (!invpcid_enabled) { secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID; /* make sure there is no no INVPCID without PCID */ guest_cpuid_disable_invpcid(vcpu); } if (nested) { ... > + > + if (nested) { > + if (invpcid_enabled) > + vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |= > + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID; > + else > + vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &= > + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID; > + } > } > > if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) > @@ -10175,6 +10190,7 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, > > /* Take the following fields only from vmcs12 */ > exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES | > + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | > SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP | > SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | > SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT); > Makes sense to me! -- Thanks, David