Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751673AbdH1Vfb (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:35:31 -0400 Received: from mail-pg0-f41.google.com ([74.125.83.41]:38550 "EHLO mail-pg0-f41.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751504AbdH1VfW (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:35:22 -0400 From: Kees Cook To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , David Windsor , "Theodore Ts'o" , Andreas Dilger , linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v2 07/30] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:34:48 -0700 Message-Id: <1503956111-36652-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2922 Lines: 89 From: David Windsor The ext4 symlink pathnames, stored in struct ext4_inode_info.i_data and therefore contained in the ext4_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/ext4/super.c: ext4_alloc_inode(...): struct ext4_inode_info *ei; ... ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &ei->vfs_inode; include/trace/events/ext4.h: #define EXT4_I(inode) \ (container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode)) fs/ext4/namei.c: ext4_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = (char *)&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len) (inlined into vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the ext4_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" Cc: Andreas Dilger Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- fs/ext4/super.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 0886fe82e9c4..79c3b1b11364 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -1038,11 +1038,13 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) static int __init init_inodecache(void) { - ext4_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ext4_inode_cache", - sizeof(struct ext4_inode_info), - 0, (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT| - SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT), - init_once); + ext4_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("ext4_inode_cache", + sizeof(struct ext4_inode_info), 0, + (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD| + SLAB_ACCOUNT), + offsetof(struct ext4_inode_info, i_data), + sizeof_field(struct ext4_inode_info, i_data), + init_once); if (ext4_inode_cachep == NULL) return -ENOMEM; return 0; -- 2.7.4