Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751493AbdILQPs (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2017 12:15:48 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:48892 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751410AbdILQPq (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2017 12:15:46 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 8127D5F73C Authentication-Results: ext-mx10.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx10.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=alex.williamson@redhat.com Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2017 10:15:45 -0600 From: Alex Williamson To: Vadim Lomovtsev Cc: bhelgaas@google.com, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David.Daney@cavium.com, jcm@redhat.com, Robert.Richter@cavium.com, Wilson.Snyder@cavium.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] PCI: quirks: update cavium ACS quirk implementation Message-ID: <20170912101545.01977624@t450s.home> In-Reply-To: <1505217316-15702-1-git-send-email-Vadim.Lomovtsev@caviumnetworks.com> References: <1505217316-15702-1-git-send-email-Vadim.Lomovtsev@caviumnetworks.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.39]); Tue, 12 Sep 2017 16:15:46 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3622 Lines: 88 On Tue, 12 Sep 2017 04:55:16 -0700 Vadim Lomovtsev wrote: > This commit makes PIC ACS quirk applicable only to Cavium PCIE devices > and Cavium PCIE Root Ports which has limited PCI capabilities in terms > of no ACS support. Match function checks for ACS support and exact ACS > bits set at the device capabilities. > Also by this commit we get rid off device ID range values checkings. > > Signed-off-by: Vadim Lomovtsev > --- > drivers/pci/quirks.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c > index a4d3361..11ca951 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c > @@ -4211,6 +4211,29 @@ static int pci_quirk_amd_sb_acs(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 acs_flags) > #endif > } > > +#define CAVIUM_ACS_FLAGS (PCI_ACS_SV | PCI_ACS_TB | PCI_ACS_RR | \ > + PCI_ACS_CR | PCI_ACS_UF | PCI_ACS_DT) > + > +static __inline__ bool pci_quirk_cavium_acs_match(struct pci_dev *dev) > +{ > + int pos = 0; > + u32 caps = 0; > + > + /* Filter out a few obvious non-matches first */ > + if (!pci_is_pcie(dev) || pci_pcie_type(dev) != PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT) > + return false; > + > + /* Get the ACS caps offset */ > + pos = pci_find_ext_capability(dev, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_ACS); > + if (pos) { > + pci_read_config_dword(dev, pos + PCI_ACS_CAP, &caps); > + /* If we have no such bits set, then we will need a quirk */ > + return ((caps & CAVIUM_ACS_FLAGS) != CAVIUM_ACS_FLAGS); > + } > + > + return true; > +} > + > static int pci_quirk_cavium_acs(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 acs_flags) > { > /* > @@ -4218,13 +4241,10 @@ static int pci_quirk_cavium_acs(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 acs_flags) > * with other functions, allowing masking out these bits as if they > * were unimplemented in the ACS capability. > */ > - acs_flags &= ~(PCI_ACS_SV | PCI_ACS_TB | PCI_ACS_RR | > - PCI_ACS_CR | PCI_ACS_UF | PCI_ACS_DT); > - > - if (!((dev->device >= 0xa000) && (dev->device <= 0xa0ff))) > + if (!pci_quirk_cavium_acs_match(dev)) > return -ENOTTY; > > - return acs_flags ? 0 : 1; > + return acs_flags & ~(CAVIUM_ACS_FLAGS) ? 0 : 1; > } > > static int pci_quirk_xgene_acs(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 acs_flags) No please. As I read it, this is assuming that any Cavium PCIe root port supports the equivalent isolation flags. Do you have a crystal ball to know about all the future PCIe root ports that Cavium is going to ship? Quirk the devices you can verify support the equivalent isolation capabilities and solve this problem automatically for future devices by implementing ACS in hardware. No free pass for all future hardware, especially not one that overrides the hardware potentially implementing ACS in the future and ignoring it if it's not sufficient. We're actually trying to be diligent to test for isolation and this entirely ignores that. Also, as we've been through with APM, how do you justify each of these ACS flags? Claiming that a device does not support peer-to-peer does not automatically justify Source Validation. What feature of your hardware allows you to claim that? How does a root port that does not support P2P imply anything about Transaction Blocking? What about Direct Translated P2P? If the device doesn't support P2P, doesn't that mean it shouldn't claim DT? Like the attempted APM quirk, I think this original quirk here has just taken and misapplied the mask we use for multifunction devices where downstream ports have much different requirements for ACS. Thanks, Alex