Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751617AbdIUCdK (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Sep 2017 22:33:10 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f179.google.com ([209.85.192.179]:54476 "EHLO mail-pf0-f179.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751640AbdIUCdG (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Sep 2017 22:33:06 -0400 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QAqcKYJuXb9oH4yP9W2fQxa/J1Hj709zqbgnFUegObmLUhZU7t1mWjmMxgbGYC+NTHoP5qUUA== From: Baolin Wang To: dhowells@redhat.com Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com, arnd@arndb.de, broonie@kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, baolin.wang@linaro.org Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2017 10:32:03 +0800 Message-Id: <0f08ea5fb66780d40f104244d5fcaa8c610ffe30.1505960744.git.baolin.wang@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.9.5 In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2477 Lines: 71 The 'struct key_preparsed_payload' will use 'time_t' which we will try to remove in the kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on 32bits systems. Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038 safe on 32 bits system for 'struct key_preparsed_payload', moreover we should use the 'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t' type variable. Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann --- include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +- security/keys/key.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index 9520fc3..05d8fb5 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload { const void *data; /* Raw data */ size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ - time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */ + time64_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */ } __randomize_layout; typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 291a67c..d5c8941 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (authkey) key_revoke(authkey); - if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) { + if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX) { key->expiry = prep->expiry; key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay); } @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, prep.data = data; prep.datalen = datalen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) { @@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) -- 1.7.9.5