Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 09:59:03 +0800
From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>, x86 <x86@kernel.org>,
        "Linux-Kernel@Vger. Kernel. Org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
Message-ID: <20171207015903.jaos5siysggzz4nc@GaryWorkstation>
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On Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 07:37:34PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Dec 05, 2017 at 04:14:26PM -0500, Josh Boyer wrote:
> > > On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 5:01 AM, Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> wrote:
> > > > The series of patches introduce Security Version to EFI stub.
> > > >
> > > > Security Version is a monotonically increasing number and designed to
> > > > prevent the user from loading an insecure kernel accidentally. The
> > > > bootloader maintains a list of security versions corresponding to
> > > > different distributions. After fixing a critical vulnerability, the
> > > > distribution kernel maintainer bumps the "version", and the bootloader
> > > > updates the list automatically. When the user tries to load a kernel
> > > > with a lower security version, the bootloader shows a warning prompt
> > > > to notify the user the potential risk.
> > > 
> > > If a distribution releases a kernel with a higher security version and
> > > that it automatically updated on boot, what happens if that kernel
> > > contains a different bug that causes it to fail to boot or break
> > > critical functionality?  At that point, the user's machine would be in
> > > a state where the higher security version is enforced but the only
> > > kernel that provides that is broken.  Wouldn't that make a bad
> > > situation even worse by now requiring manual acceptance of the older
> > > SV kernel boot physically at the machine?
> > > 
> > > I feel like I'm missing a detail here or something.
> > > 
> > If the new kernel fails to boot, then the user has to choose the kernel
> > manually anyway, and there will be an option in the warning prompt to
> > lower SV.
> 
> And what if the firmware does not support a lowering of the SV?
> 
The SV list is manipulated by the bootloader, and the firmware only
provides the interface to the storage, i.e. non-volatile flash.

Cheers,

Gary Lin