Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S270669AbTGNSsC (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 14:48:02 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S270660AbTGNSsB (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 14:48:01 -0400 Received: from parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk ([195.92.249.252]:33156 "EHLO www.linux.org.uk") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S270669AbTGNSr6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jul 2003 14:47:58 -0400 Message-ID: <3F12FE4B.2070004@pobox.com> Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2003 15:02:35 -0400 From: Jeff Garzik Organization: none User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.2.1) Gecko/20021213 Debian/1.2.1-2.bunk X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: David griego CC: alan@storlinksemi.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: Alan Shih: "TCP IP Offloading Interface" References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 887 Lines: 24 David griego wrote: > IMHO, there are several cases for some type of TCP/IP offload. One is > for embedded systems that are just not capable of doing 1Gbps+. Another > is with 10GbE, even high end servers will not be able keep up with TCP > processing/data movement at these speeds. Not being proactive in > adopting TCP/IP offload will force Linux into accepting some scheme that > will not necissarily be best. How does one evaluate a TOE stack to be sure that all the security fixes in Linux are also in that stack? How does one evaluate a TOE stack to be sure it doesn't add new security holes that Linux never had? Jeff - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/