Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 16:32:02 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
        Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>, aliguori@amazon.com,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared
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On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 07:14:41AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 12/13/2017 04:57 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > Dave, what is effect of this on protection keys?
> 
> The goal was to make pkeys-protected userspace memory access
> _consistent_ with normal access.  Specifically, we want a kernel to
> disallow access (or writes) to memory where userspace mapping has a pkey
> whose permissions are in conflict with the access.
> 
> For instance:
> 
> This will fault writing a byte to 'addr':
> 
> 	char *addr = malloc(PAGE_SIZE);
> 	pkey_mprotect(addr, PAGE_SIZE, 13);
> 	pkey_deny_access(13);
> 	*addr[0] = 'f';
> 
> But this will write one byte to addr successfully (if it uses the kernel
> mapping of the physical page backing 'addr'):
> 
> 	char *addr = malloc(PAGE_SIZE);
> 	pkey_mprotect(addr, PAGE_SIZE, 13);
> 	pkey_deny_access(13);
> 	read(fd, addr, 1);
> 

This seems confused to me; why are these two cases different?