Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753350AbeADTFk (ORCPT + 1 other); Thu, 4 Jan 2018 14:05:40 -0500 Received: from mail-io0-f177.google.com ([209.85.223.177]:39612 "EHLO mail-io0-f177.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752715AbeADTFg (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Jan 2018 14:05:36 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACJfBotCox1F+z7fZHFKE8p0nWKXc/2iHP9nfrsYVxT60NaxYOxRhh6sPyLdcOoXhHd9LKeDMRvxuc3464dvSd2MrDM= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: From: Justin Forbes Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 13:05:34 -0600 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] IBRS patch series To: Tim Chen Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Andy Lutomirski , Linus Torvalds , Greg KH , Dave Hansen , Andrea Arcangeli , Andi Kleen , Arjan Van De Ven , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Tim Chen wrote: > This patch series enables the basic detection and usage of x86 indirect > branch speculation feature. It enables the indirect branch restricted > speculation (IBRS) on kernel entry and disables it on exit. > It enumerates the indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB). > > The x86 IBRS feature requires corresponding microcode support. > It mitigates the variant 2 vulnerability described in > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html > Are there plans to make the corresponding microcode support available?