Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753207AbeADTvk (ORCPT + 1 other); Thu, 4 Jan 2018 14:51:40 -0500 Received: from mail.physik-pool.tu-berlin.de ([130.149.50.25]:48244 "EHLO mail.physik.tu-berlin.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751829AbeADTvj (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Jan 2018 14:51:39 -0500 X-Greylist: delayed 355 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Thu, 04 Jan 2018 14:51:39 EST From: Alexander Kleinsorge Subject: proposal for meltdown-workaround with low overhead To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Message-ID: <9f274ca7-732d-810a-4e51-83309b96d14b@physik.tu-berlin.de> Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 20:45:36 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.5.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Hi all, This is my first post here and I hope it is fine. I will subscribe tomorrow to this list, so please take me in CC for answers now. As Meltdown-Issue depends on allowing to cause many exceptions (usually : accessing an invalid address), we could restrict this misusage easy. My rough proposal that should give an idea and some of them in combination should fix the problem. Of course root and a special new group could be excluded from these restrictions. But especially for JIT-Engine, we should be strict here inside exception handling code. The normal performance should not be affected, only exception handling (kernel OS part, not user part) a little. If an attack is detected (via counter threshold), prevent start new processes by this user (including forks), or stop/suspend this (or all existing?) process(es) of this user. 1. Limit the number of this exception kind by a per user counter, as I don't see a use case for normal operation to cause high frequent memory probes. (e.g. 1/sec and/or 100 since boot, or similar - configurable parameters perhaps) And if someone needs this, he needs to get the right for it (e.g. via new memory_exception_group). 2. Limit the fork count (similar to step 1). Especially JIT-users should not need (e.g.) >10 forks per sec (again configurable). 3. Perhaps memory transaction (variant) can also be handled somehow via a sufficieant delay after such exception (e.g. pausing all processes of same user for some sleep-ms). Depending on details, this slows down the attack sigificantly and can even completely prevent it (by hard counter limits for guests or unpriviliged users). Let's fight is from the other side. kind regards, Alexander