Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751706AbeAEMHO (ORCPT + 1 other); Fri, 5 Jan 2018 07:07:14 -0500 Received: from www.llwyncelyn.cymru ([82.70.14.225]:50280 "EHLO fuzix.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751015AbeAEMHM (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Jan 2018 07:07:12 -0500 Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 12:06:47 +0000 From: Alan Cox To: james harvey Cc: Jiri Kosina , Andi Kleen , Thomas Gleixner , Linus Torvalds , Greg Kroah-Hartman , dwmw@amazon.co.uk, Tim Chen , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Dave Hansen Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Message-ID: <20180105120647.0c717720@alans-desktop> In-Reply-To: References: <20180103230934.15788-1-andi@firstfloor.org> <20180104000927.co5umvfzfwliqvqt@two.firstfloor.org> <20180104001501.3jof7zkrfkehnd3r@two.firstfloor.org> Organization: Intel Corporation X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.15.1-dirty (GTK+ 2.24.31; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: > But, are the GCC patches being discussed also expected to fix the > vulnerability because user binaries will be compiled using them? In If you have a system with just a few user binaries where you are concerned about such a thing you might go that way. > such case, a binary could be maliciously changed back, or a custom GCC > made with the patches reverted. If I can change your gcc or your binary then instead of removing the speculation protection I can make it encrypt all your files instead. Much simpler. At the point I can do this you already lost. Alan