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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:10:38 -0800
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4iagGa+Mj9VJcc604N_JYadB7nci7fF=GuzhtOhR5HH2w@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
        Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
        Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
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On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 7:14 AM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> On Sat, Jan 06, 2018 at 12:23:47PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
>>> On Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:01:54 +0100
>>> Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:11:10PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> > > Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
>>> >
>>> > Can I see the rule that determined that?  It does not feel like that is
>>> > correct, given the 3+ levels deep that this function gets this value
>>> > from...
>>>
>>> On a current x86 you can execute something upwards of 150 instructions in
>>> a speculation window.
>>
>> Yeah, I agree, it's deep :(
>>
>> But for this patch, I thought the prior review determined that it was
>> not a problem.  Was that somehow proven incorrect?
>
> I kept it in the series to get a re-review with the wider netdev
> because I missed the discussion leading up to that 'drop the patch'
> decision. Sorry, I should have noted that in the changelog or cover
> letter.

Is there a microbenchmark that can stress this path. If the cost is
negligible why play games with it being "probably ok"? Unless someone
can say 100% 'offset' is always bounded to something safe by the time
we get here just use nospec_array_ptr().