Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753527AbeAFUHg (ORCPT + 1 other); Sat, 6 Jan 2018 15:07:36 -0500 Received: from mail-oi0-f66.google.com ([209.85.218.66]:37944 "EHLO mail-oi0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752957AbeAFUHa (ORCPT ); Sat, 6 Jan 2018 15:07:30 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACJfBosd71LBPuPI6NJF7wDIXAhFixqu4Oi13fdpsmrvodFoZeRF+YgKufOSYbbCh9U/m58pexblLGfl9NYnjHaHAIs= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <151520099201.32271.4677179499894422956.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> From: Dan Williams Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 12:07:29 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution To: Linux Kernel Mailing List Cc: Mark Rutland , Peter Zijlstra , Alan Cox , Srinivas Pandruvada , Will Deacon , Solomon Peachy , "H. Peter Anvin" , Christian Lamparter , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen , "James E.J. Bottomley" , linux-scsi , Jonathan Corbet , X86 ML , Ingo Molnar , Alexey Kuznetsov , Zhang Rui , "Linux-media@vger.kernel.org" , Arnd Bergmann , Jan Kara , Eduardo Valentin , Al Viro , qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com, Thomas Gleixner , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Arjan van de Ven , Kalle Valo , Alan Cox , "Martin K. Petersen" , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Greg KH , linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" , Netdev , Linus Torvalds , "David S. Miller" , Laurent Pinchart Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Dan Williams wrote: > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote: >> Quoting Mark's original RFC: >> >> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack >> against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows >> explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an >> arbitrary read gadget. Further details can be found on the GPZ blog [1] >> and the Documentation patch in this series." >> >> This series incorporates Mark Rutland's latest api and adds the x86 >> specific implementation of nospec_barrier. The >> nospec_{array_ptr,ptr,barrier} helpers are then combined with a kernel >> wide analysis performed by Elena Reshetova to address static analysis >> reports where speculative execution on a userspace controlled value >> could bypass a bounds check. The patches address a precondition for the >> attack discussed in the Spectre paper [2]. >> >> A consideration worth noting for reviewing these patches is to weigh the >> dramatic cost of being wrong about whether a given report is exploitable >> vs the overhead nospec_{array_ptr,ptr} may introduce. In other words, >> lets make the bar for applying these patches be "can you prove that the >> bounds check bypass is *not* exploitable". Consider that the Spectre >> paper reports one example of a speculation window being ~180 cycles. >> >> Note that there is also a proposal from Linus, array_access [3], that >> attempts to quash speculative execution past a bounds check without >> introducing an lfence instruction. That may be a future optimization >> possibility that is compatible with this api, but it would appear to >> need guarantees from the compiler that it is not clear the kernel can >> rely on at this point. It is also not clear that it would be a >> significant performance win vs lfence. >> >> These patches also will also be available via the 'nospec' git branch >> here: >> >> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djbw/linux nospec > > It appears that git.kernel.org has not mirrored out the new branch. In > the meantime here's an alternative location: > > https://github.com/djbw/linux.git nospec > > If there are updates to these patches they will appear in nospec-v2, > nospec-v3, etc... branches. For completeness I appended the bpf fix [1] to the git branch. https://lwn.net/Articles/743288/