Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754628AbeAGURP (ORCPT + 1 other); Sun, 7 Jan 2018 15:17:15 -0500 Received: from mail-io0-f181.google.com ([209.85.223.181]:40589 "EHLO mail-io0-f181.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754497AbeAGURM (ORCPT ); Sun, 7 Jan 2018 15:17:12 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACJfBov2ecwIMQR45DR/z8lXhN3oty/QPdoNU9ozIAgZBR3nzwpBlYgDD8kbLnRs+HEpLXupf6Zrv4fiS4XPxfZtV98= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20180107201211.GA9996@1wt.eu> References: <20180106183859.1ad9ae37@alans-desktop> <20180106185134.dzn2en4vw2hj3p6h@ast-mbp> <20180106195551.3207f75d@alans-desktop> <20180106200912.zhzdt4qmfrojeeqe@ast-mbp> <20180106202213.23e553fb@alans-desktop> <20180106211729.cp5oet3at3hyce4o@ast-mbp> <20180106230507.3547c9a0@alans-desktop> <20180107033812.awq3vz4gdkps7tix@ast-mbp> <20180107063356.GA9425@1wt.eu> <20180107201211.GA9996@1wt.eu> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 12:17:11 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: JOQ-LX151kqcVH3ju-HkZQpy3mo Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok To: Willy Tarreau Cc: Alexei Starovoitov , Alan Cox , Dan Williams , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Peter Zijlstra , Network Development , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Willy Tarreau wrote: > > Linus, no need to explain that to me, I'm precisely trying to see how > to disable PTI for a specific process because I face up to 45% loss in > certain circumstances, making it a no-go. But while a few of us have > very specific workloads emphasizing this impact, others have very > different ones and will not notice. For example my laptop did boot > pretty fine and I didn't notice anything until I fire a network > benchmark. Sure, most people have hardware where the bottleneck is entirely elsewhere (slow network, rotating disk, whatever). But this whole "normal people won't notice" is dangerous thinking. They may well notice very much, we simply don't know what they are doing. Quite honesty, it's equally correct to say "normal people won't be affected by the security issue in the first place". That laptop that you didn't have any issues with? Likely it never had an exploit running on it either! So the whole "normal people" argument is pure and utter garbage. It's wrong. It's pure shit when it comes to performance, but it's also pure shit when it comes to the security issue. Don't use it. We need to fix the security problem, but we need to do it *without* these braindead arguments that performance is somehow secondary. Linus