Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753739AbeAIOZW (ORCPT + 1 other); Tue, 9 Jan 2018 09:25:22 -0500 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:49908 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753129AbeAIOZS (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jan 2018 09:25:18 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.46,335,1511856000"; d="scan'208";a="165367039" Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 16:25:06 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: greg@enjellic.com Cc: Pavel Machek , platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , "David S. Miller" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Grzegorz Andrejczuk , Haim Cohen , Ingo Molnar , Janakarajan Natarajan , Jim Mattson , Kan Liang , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Kyle Huey , Len Brown , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Paolo Bonzini , Piotr Luc , Radim Kr??m???? , Randy Dunlap , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Tom Lendacky , Vikas Shivappa Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver Message-ID: <20180109142506.u3mpwz6snmtitxp6@linux.intel.com> References: <201801040906.w0496h39025733@wind.enjellic.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <201801040906.w0496h39025733@wind.enjellic.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170609 (1.8.3) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 03:06:43AM -0600, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote: > If we are talking about the issues motivating the KPTI work I don't > have any useful information beyond what is raging through the industry > right now. > > With respect to SGX, the issues giving rise to KPTI are characteristic > of what this technology is designed to address. The technical 'news' > sites, which are even more of an abomination then usual with this > issue, are talking about privileged information such as credentials, > passwords et.al being leaked by this vulnerability. > > Data committed to enclaves are only accessible by the enclave, even > the kernel, by definition, can't access the memory. Given current > events that is an arguably useful behavior. Exactly. You could think adversary using meltdown leak utilizing malware as having same capabilities as peripheral connected to a bus, which we can defend against with SGX. /Jarkko