Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759956AbeAIU5d (ORCPT + 1 other); Tue, 9 Jan 2018 15:57:33 -0500 Received: from mail-pf0-f196.google.com ([209.85.192.196]:40602 "EHLO mail-pf0-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758151AbeAIU5K (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jan 2018 15:57:10 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACJfBot9erCzswLw9cPPwWBUN7mB37XBQ/PiS7GorxJEyTrlpTmsk4yKazpQulmLs3dxfWAfLajhuA== From: Kees Cook To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , David Windsor , Ingo Molnar , Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Andy Lutomirski , Linus Torvalds , Alexander Viro , Christoph Hellwig , Christoph Lameter , "David S. Miller" , Laura Abbott , Mark Rutland , "Martin K. Petersen" , Paolo Bonzini , Christian Borntraeger , Christoffer Dall , Dave Kleikamp , Jan Kara , Luis de Bethencourt , Marc Zyngier , Rik van Riel , Matthew Garrett , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH 27/36] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 12:55:56 -0800 Message-Id: <1515531365-37423-28-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1515531365-37423-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1515531365-37423-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: From: David Windsor In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and !CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_thread_stack_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...) dup_task_struct(...): ... stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...) ... tsk->stack = stack; copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Rik van Riel --- kernel/fork.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 82f2a0441d3b..0e086af148f2 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -282,8 +282,9 @@ static void free_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk) void thread_stack_cache_init(void) { - thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create("thread_stack", THREAD_SIZE, - THREAD_SIZE, 0, NULL); + thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("thread_stack", + THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE, 0, 0, + THREAD_SIZE, NULL); BUG_ON(thread_stack_cache == NULL); } # endif -- 2.7.4