Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932666AbeAIU6m (ORCPT + 1 other); Tue, 9 Jan 2018 15:58:42 -0500 Received: from mail-pf0-f194.google.com ([209.85.192.194]:38111 "EHLO mail-pf0-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1759841AbeAIU5U (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Jan 2018 15:57:20 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACJfBovpyJlTcuCD8U/FiqvHoikW96YfY29iXe5SePWQbRC5OlV2cyzWfl7mWUmPuZalXZT2KsF/EA== From: Kees Cook To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , David Windsor , Dave Kleikamp , jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net, Linus Torvalds , Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Christoph Hellwig , Christoph Lameter , "David S. Miller" , Laura Abbott , Mark Rutland , "Martin K. Petersen" , Paolo Bonzini , Christian Borntraeger , Christoffer Dall , Dave Kleikamp , Jan Kara , Luis de Bethencourt , Marc Zyngier , Rik van Riel , Matthew Garrett , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH 12/36] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip slab cache Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 12:55:41 -0800 Message-Id: <1515531365-37423-13-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1515531365-37423-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1515531365-37423-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: From: David Windsor The jfs symlink pathnames, stored in struct jfs_inode_info.i_inline and therefore contained in the jfs_ip slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/jfs/super.c: jfs_alloc_inode(...): ... jfs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(jfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &jfs_inode->vfs_inode; fs/jfs/jfs_incore.h: JFS_IP(struct inode *inode): return container_of(inode, struct jfs_inode_info, vfs_inode); fs/jfs/inode.c: jfs_iget(...): ... inode->i_link = JFS_IP(inode)->i_inline; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the jfs_ip slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Dave Kleikamp Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp --- fs/jfs/super.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/super.c b/fs/jfs/super.c index 90373aebfdca..1b9264fd54b6 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/super.c +++ b/fs/jfs/super.c @@ -965,9 +965,11 @@ static int __init init_jfs_fs(void) int rc; jfs_inode_cachep = - kmem_cache_create("jfs_ip", sizeof(struct jfs_inode_info), 0, - SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT, - init_once); + kmem_cache_create_usercopy("jfs_ip", sizeof(struct jfs_inode_info), + 0, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT, + offsetof(struct jfs_inode_info, i_inline), + sizeof_field(struct jfs_inode_info, i_inline), + init_once); if (jfs_inode_cachep == NULL) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.7.4