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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 13:59:04 -0800
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4iit=mESt2Mh0Wbvag3=tV6vEZt=NsHPUnj3ksgRzQKiQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
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On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:49 PM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 01:47:09PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:41 PM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 06:52:07PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> >> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
>> >> > From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
>> >> >
>> >> > When access_ok fails we should always stop speculating.
>> >> > Add the required barriers to the x86 access_ok macro.
>> >>
>> >> Honestly, this seems completely bogus.
>> >>
>> >> The description is pure garbage afaik.
>> >>
>> >> The fact is, we have to stop speculating when access_ok() does *not*
>> >> fail - because that's when we'll actually do the access. And it's that
>> >> access that needs to be non-speculative.
>> >>
>> >> That actually seems to be what the code does (it stops speculation
>> >> when __range_not_ok() returns false, but access_ok() is
>> >> !__range_not_ok()). But the explanation is crap, and dangerous.
>> >
>> > The description also seems to be missing the "why", as it's not
>> > self-evident (to me, at least).
>> >
>> > Isn't this (access_ok/uaccess_begin/ASM_STAC) too early for the lfence?
>> >
>> > i.e., wouldn't the pattern be:
>> >
>> >         get_user(uval, uptr);
>> >         if (uval < array_size) {
>> >                 lfence();
>> >                 foo = a2[a1[uval] * 256];
>> >         }
>> >
>> > Shouldn't the lfence come much later, *after* reading the variable and
>> > comparing it and branching accordingly?
>>
>> The goal of putting the lfence in uaccess_begin() is to prevent
>> speculation past access_ok().
>
> Right, but what's the purpose of preventing speculation past
> access_ok()?

Caution. It's the same rationale for the nospec_array_ptr() patches.
If we, kernel community, can identify any possible speculation past a
bounds check we should inject a speculation mitigation. Unless there's
a way to be 100% certain that the first unwanted speculation can be
turned into a gadget later on in the instruction stream, err on the
side of shutting it down early.