Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and
 MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com, liran.alon@oracle.com, jmattson@google.com,
        aliguori@amazon.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, bp@alien8.de,
        x86@kernel.org
References: <20180109120311.27565-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
 <20180109120311.27565-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-ID: <18c3f6e4-84af-87c8-3441-d8b368ade1c8@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 14:13:28 -0600
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On 1/9/2018 6:03 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is important
> for performance.  Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore guest
> IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not use
> it yet).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c

...

> @@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  #endif
>  		);
>  
> +	if (have_spec_ctrl) {
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> +		if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> +			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> +	}
> +	/*
> +	 * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
> +	 * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
> +	 * indirect branch predictor; block it.
> +	 */
> +	asm("lfence");

This will end up needing to be an alternative macro based on the
LFENCE_RDTSC or MFENCE_RDTSC features [1].  You'll probably just want to
use the speculation barrier macro that ends up being defined to control
the speculation here.

Thanks,
Tom

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151545930207815&w=2

> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>  	wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
>  #else
>