Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932947AbeALIUn (ORCPT + 1 other); Fri, 12 Jan 2018 03:20:43 -0500 Received: from wind.enjellic.com ([76.10.64.91]:60312 "EHLO wind.enjellic.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754280AbeALIUm (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 Jan 2018 03:20:42 -0500 Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 02:20:09 -0600 From: "Dr. Greg Wettstein" Message-Id: <201801120820.w0C8K9WC014594@wind.enjellic.com> In-Reply-To: Alan Cox "Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel" (Jan 5, 12:12pm) Reply-To: greg@enjellic.com X-Mailer: Mail User's Shell (7.2.6-ESD1.0 03/31/2012) To: Alan Cox , Thomas Gleixner Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Cc: Jon Masters , "Woodhouse, David" , Paolo Bonzini , Linus Torvalds , Andi Kleen , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tim Chen , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Dave Hansen , Jeff Law , Nick Clifton X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.3 (wind.enjellic.com [0.0.0.0]); Fri, 12 Jan 2018 02:20:10 -0600 (CST) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: On Jan 5, 12:12pm, Alan Cox wrote: } Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Good morning to everyone, a bit behind on mail given everything which has been going on. > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018 01:54:13 +0100 (CET) > Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > On Thu, 4 Jan 2018, Jon Masters wrote: > > > P.S. I've an internal document where I've been tracking "nice to haves" > > > for later, and one of them is whether it makes sense to tag binaries as > > > "trusted" (e.g. extended attribute, label, whatever). It was something I > > > wanted to bring up at some point as potentially worth considering. > > > > Scratch that. There is no such thing as a trusted binary. > There is if you are using signing and the like. I'm sure SELinux and > friends will grow the ability to set per process policy but that's > certainly not a priority. > > However the question is wrong. 'trusted' is a binary operator not a > unary one. Alan's observations are correct. In our autonomous introspection work we apply the notion that 'trusted' is a binary characteristic of a context of execution (COE). Its value is an expression of whether or not the information exchange events it has been involved in have deviated from the desired execution trajectory path of the system. It is a decidedly different way of thinking about things. Most importantly it is a namespaceable characteristic. We have already written the futuristic LSM that Alan aludes to in order to implement per COE security policies and forensics for actors/COE's that have gone over to the 'dark side'. > Alan Have a good weekend. Dr. Greg }-- End of excerpt from Alan Cox As always, Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D. Enjellic Systems Development, LLC. 4206 N. 19th Ave. Specializing in information infra-structure Fargo, ND 58102 development. PH: 701-281-1686 FAX: 701-281-3949 EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Given a choice between a complex, difficult-to-understand, disconcerting explanation and a simplistic, comforting one, many prefer simplistic comfort if it's remotely plausible, especially if it involves blaming someone else for their problems." -- Bob Lewis _Infoworld_